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PROSECUTION OF MARITIME PIRATES: THE 
NATIONAL COURT IS DEAD—LONG LIVE THE 
NATIONAL COURT? 
MD SAIFUL KARIM

 
ABSTRACT 
Piracy is one of the main maritime security concerns in the 
contemporary world. The number of piracy incidents is increasing 
rapidly, which is highly problematic for maritime security. Although 
international law provides universal jurisdiction for the prosecution of 
maritime pirates, the actual number of prosecutions is alarmingly low 
compared to the number of incidents of piracy. Despite many states 
becoming parties to the relevant international conventions, they are 
reluctant to establish the necessary legal and institutional frameworks at 
the national level for the prosecution of pirates. The growing incidences 
of piracy and the consequential problems associated with prosecuting 
pirates have created doubts about the adequacy of the current 
international legal system, which is fully dependent on national courts 
for the prosecution of pirates. This article examines the possible ways for 
ensuring the effective prosecution of pirates. Contrary to the different 
proposals forwarded by researchers in the wake of Somali piracy for the 
establishment of international judicial institutions for the prosecution of 
pirates, this article argues that the operationalization of national courts 
through the proper implementation of relevant international legal 
instruments within domestic legal systems is the most viable solution. 
However, this article submits that the operationalization of national 
courts will not be very successful following the altruistic model of 
universal adjudicative jurisdiction. A state may enact legislation 
implementing universal jurisdiction but will not be very interested in 
prosecuting a pirate in its national court if it has no relation with the 
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piratical incident. Rather, it will be successful if the global community 
seriously implement the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), 
which obligates the states that have some connection with a piratical 
incident to prosecute pirates in their national courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Piracy is one of the main maritime security concerns in the 
contemporary world.1 At the end of the nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth century, incidents of piracy were declining and were supposed 
                                                 
 
1
  In 2008, the U.N. Secretary General identified seven major threats to the maritime security, of 
which piracy was identified first. See U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of Sea: Rep. 
of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 54–71, U.N. Doc. A/63/63 (Mar. 10, 2008). Piracy has been 
identified as the major threat to the maritime security in some subsequent reports, see U.N. 
Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of Sea: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 127–134, U.N. 
Doc. A/64/66 (Mar. 13, 2009); U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of Sea: Rep. of the 
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/65/69/Add.2 (Aug. 31, 2010). 
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to become an issue of historical interest.2 However, piracy again emerged 
as a major concern for the global community from the 1970s,3 when it 
returned more aggressively. Nowadays, piracy is one of the main 
problems of the sea transport system.4 
The number of piracy incidents is increasing rapidly, which is 
highly problematic for maritime security.5 There are some piracy 
hotspots in the world. The most affected areas for piracy are the Gulf of 
Aden, the Red Sea, and the waters off the coasts of Somalia, Bangladesh, 
Nigeria, Indonesia, and Malaysia.6 Recently, a large number of piracy 
incidents have occurred off the coast of Somalia, leading the global 
community to think about this age-old problem from a new perspective.7 
Piracy has again become a major issue, not only for its increasing 
occurrence, but also for the adverse effects on global trade and 
commerce.8 Piratical activities in the twenty-first century appear to be 
                                                 
 
2
  H.E. José Luis Jesus, Protection of Foreign Ships against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: Legal 
Aspects, 18 INT’L. J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 363, 364 (2003). The number of piracy incidents 
declined in the early twentieth century, as indicated by the tit le of an article written by E D 
Dickinson in 1925, namely ‘Is the crime of piracy obsolete?’ Dickinson was visionary enough to 
identify the future importance of the law of piracy and commented that ‘[w]hile the occasions for 
invoking its rules are less frequent, it  may still be made a potent factor in preventing lawlessness 
upon the seas’. He went further and said that the law of piracy belonged to ‘the law in reserve 
rather than to the law in history’. Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete? , 38 
HARV. L. REV. 334 (1925). 
 3  Jesus, supra note 2, at 363–4. 
 
4
  Id. at  363; U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 1; LAUREN PLOCH ET AL., PIRACY OFF THE HORN 
OF AFRICA 5 (2009). 
 
5
  PLOCH, supra note 4; Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships: Annual Report 2009 , ¶ 8, IMO Doc. MSC.4/Circ152 (Mar. 29, 2010); IMO, 
Report on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, ¶ 4, Doc. MSC.4/Cric133 (Mar. 19, 
2009); IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2010 , 
¶ 5, Doc. MSC.4/Circ169 (Apr. 1, 2011); IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships: Annual Report 2011, ¶ 5, IMO Doc. MSC.4/Circ180 (Mar. 1, 2012); IMO, Report 
on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2012 , ¶ 5, Doc. 
MSC.4/Circ.193 (Apr. 2, 2013); Stuart McMillan, Piracy: An Old Menace Re-Emerges, N.Z. 
INT’L. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 21, 22. 
 
6
  INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS–ANNUAL REPORT 2009, 6 
(2010). 
 
7
  Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of 
Somalia, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 399 (2009); Eugene Kontorovich, A Guantanamo on the Sea: The 
Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CAL. L. REV. 243 (2010). 
 
8
  Alexa K. Sullivan, Piracy in the Horn of Africa and its Effects on the Global Supply Chain , 3 J. 
T RANSP . SEC. 231 (2010); Xiaowen Fu et al., The Impacts of Maritime Piracy on Global 
Economic Development: The Case of Somalia , 37 MAR. POL’Y & MGMT. 677 (2010). 
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more frequent, sophisticated, and severe compared to the twentieth 
century’s blight of piratical activity.9 
Although international law provides universal jurisdiction for the 
prosecution of maritime pirates, the actual number of prosecutions is 
alarmingly low compared to the number of incidents of piracy.10 Despite 
many states becoming parties to the relevant international conventions,11 
they are reluctant to establish the necessary legal and institutional 
frameworks at the national level for the prosecution of pirates. However, 
due to growing awareness created by Somali piracy, states are gradually 
changing this attitude. Under international law, the prosecution of pirates 
is entirely within the domain of national courts, as no international court 
or tribunal has jurisdiction to prosecute an individual for piracy. 
International law has instead anticipated a vital role for national courts 
for the enforcement of international law relating to piracy. This is an area 
of international law where the national court is the main judicial 
institution for the implementation of international law. 
The growing incidence of piracy and the consequential problems 
associated with prosecuting pirates have created doubts about the 
adequacy of the current international legal system, which is fully 
dependent on national courts for the prosecution of pirates. Although it is 
not possible to determine whether the non-operationalization12  of 
national courts has played a role in the increasing occurrence of piracy, 
the need to reassess the existing system cannot be ignored. It is apparent 
                                                 
 
9
  John I. Winn & Kevin H. Govern, Maritime Pirates, Sea Robbers, and Terrorists: New 
Approaches to Emerging Threats, 2 HOMELAND SEC. REV. 131, 132 (2008). 
 
10
  U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Possible Options to Further the 
Aim of Prosecuting and Imprisoning Persons Responsible for Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
at Sea off the Coast of Somalia, U.N. Doc. S/2010/394 (Jul. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Secretary 
General Report 2010]; U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-
General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, ¶ 43, U. N. Doc. S/2011/30 
(Jan. 25, 2011), 21 [hereinafter Special Adviser Report].  
 
11
  See United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, Dec. 10 , 1982, 1833 U.N.T .S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter SUA Convention 1988].  
 
12
  In this article, the term operationalization or operationalize is employed to determine whether a 
judicial institution is working or ready to be used for the prosecution of offenders. This term 
signifies something broader than the mere implementation of international law; it  will be used to 
show whether an institution is practically operating, thereby enhancing the application of 
international law. On operationalization, See generally Jeni L. Burnette, Operationalization, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 635 (Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs eds., 
2007); CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1002 (Catherine Soanes & Angus Stevenson 
eds., 2006); Operationalisation, 
http://www.une.edu.au/WebStat/unit_materials/c2_research_design/operation alism.htm (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
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that the timely prosecution of pirates will serve as an effective deterrent 
for people who are engaged in this activity, as well as discourage new 
people from being recruited as pirates. 
The legal and practical complexity surrounding the prosecution 
of Somali pirates reveals some problems with the existing international 
legal and institutional framework. The situation in Somalia has 
compelled the global community to reflect on whether the current 
reliance on national courts needs reform. Through Resolution 1918, the 
Security Council requested the Secretary-General propose possible 
options for the prosecution of Somali pirates, including “options for 
creating special domestic chambers possibly with international 
components, a regional tribunal or an international tribunal and 
corresponding imprisonment arrangements.”13 Accordingly, the 
Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council identifying 
seven options for prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for 
acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia.14 The Security 
Council now appears to be convinced that the establishment of 
specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia and other states in the region 
with substantial international participation and/or support, as well as 
capacity building of national courts in the region (and globally), may be 
the most suitable option.15 
Concurring with the most recent approach of the global 
community, this article argues that the operationalization of national 
courts is the most viable option for ensuring the effective prosecution of 
pirates. The operationalization process will only be successful if there is 
a firm political will from the executive of the states for the 
implementation of international law in the domestic arena, as well as a 
proactive role from judicial institutions in interpreting national law in the 
light of international obligations. However, in operationalizing national 
courts, states may be reluctant to follow the altruistic model of universal 
adjudicative jurisdiction established by UNCLOS. A state may not be 
very interested in prosecuting a pirate in its national court if it has no 
relation with the piratical incident.16 Against this backdrop it may be 
                                                 
 
13
  S.C. Res. 1918, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1918 (Apr. 27, 2010). 
 
14
  See Secretary General Report 2010, supra note 10. 
 
15
  S.C. Res 2015, ¶¶ 18, 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2015 (Oct. 24, 2011). 
 
16
  It  can be argued that countries in the African region are now prosecuting Somali pirates even 
without any relation to incidents of piracy. In fact, they are doing this with external financial 
assistance. However “the burden that long and costly trials place on these nations often makes it  
unappealing for them to accept captured pirates unless supplemented by financial support from 
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vitally important to implement the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 
Convention), which obligates the states that have some connection with a 
piratical incident to prosecute pirates in their national courts.17 
Part I of this article introduces the international law of piracy.  
This part deals with some contemporary and longstanding debates 
surrounding the suitability of universal jurisdiction, codified in the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), for the 
prosecution of individuals involved in maritime piracy. It also examines 
the applicability of other international conventions in respect to maritime 
piracy and armed robbery. It further examines whether these later 
conventions are successful in filling the gaps in the UNCLOS regime. 
Finally, this part examines the importance of operationalizing the roles of 
national courts in the context of universal jurisdiction. Part II presents a 
case study on Somali piracy, and explains the practical complexity in 
prosecuting pirates based on universal jurisdiction in light of the Somali 
experience. Part III explores the options for the prosecution of pirates 
generally, and discusses the role of national and international courts in 
their prosecution. It also examines a number of options for the 
establishment of an effective prosecution system, including creating an 
international judicial mechanism, as well as strengthening and 
operationalizing the anticipated roles of national courts. Part IV 
concludes with some observations for a more coherent legal and 
institutional framework for the effective prosecution of pirates. 
I.  INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PIRACY 
The main aim of this section is to determine the jurisdictional 
scope of national courts for the prosecution of pirates. There are two 
important jurisdictional issues in assessing the role of judicial 
institutions. First, what types of maritime violence can be treated as 
piracy? Second, what is the jurisdictional scope for different states to 
prosecute the perpetrator? 
A. DEFINITION OF PIRACY UNDER UNCLOS AND THE ISSUE OF THE 
                                                 
the international community.” AMBER RAMSEY, REGIONAL COURTS AND PRISONS: DEVELOPING 
LOCAL CAPACITY TO PROSECUTE SOMALI PIRATES (2012). 
 
17
  This proposition has been supported by economic analysis, see Paul Hallwood and Thomas J. 
Miceli, The Economics of International Cooperation in the Apprehension and Prosecution of 
Maritime Pirates, 43 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 188 (2012). 
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OPERATIONALIZATION OF COURTS 
The international law definition of piracy as stated in UNCLOS 
is very restricted in relation to the geographical and subject matter 
aspects.18 The definition of piracy has at least three shortcomings that 
make the UNCLOS provisions largely inapplicable in combating many 
aspects of modern-day maritime violence: geographic limits, the 
condition of private ends, and the two ships’ condition. The issues of 
private ends and the two ships are not very problematic for piracy.19 As a 
large number of contemporary piratical incidents occur within the 
territorial seas of the coastal state, the geographic limits of UNCLOS’s 
provision is now a very important issue and is discussed below. 
i. Geographic Limits 
As defined in UNCLOS, piracy must be on the high seas or in 
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).20 Maritime violence outside the 
territorial seas was historically regarded as piracy if it fulfilled other 
conditions. UNCLOS created the sui generis zone of the EEZ where the 
coastal state has sovereign rights, not sovereignty, and UNCLOS 
                                                 
 
18
  UNCLOS defines piracy as follows: 
“Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by 
the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such 
ship or aircraft  
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State  
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of 
facts making it  a pirate ship or aircraft  
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).” 
UNCLOS, supra note 11, art . 101. This definition is now regarded as the general definition of 
piracy. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982: A COMMENTARY 197 
(Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2002). 
 
19
  However, there are serious problems regarding the applicability of the international law of 
piracy in respect to maritime terrorism. 
 
20
  UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 58(2). According to Article 58(3) of UNCLOS, “ In exercising 
their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, 
States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the 
laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this 
Part.” This article may raise a question as to whether this due regard obligation confers any 
regulatory power on the coastal state. In fact “ the due regard duty does not confer regulatory 
power on any of its beneficiary.” J. Ashley Roach, Countering Piracy off Somalia: International 
Law and International Institutions, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 397, 398–99 (2010). 
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specifically made a provision to ensure the applicability of international 
law related to piracy in the EEZ.21 The provision does not extend to 
maritime violence in the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, and internal 
waters of the coastal state. However, many of the modern-day attacks on 
ships occur in the territorial seas of coastal states.22 Statistics show that 
more than two-thirds of the reported incidents are outside the scope of 
the present definition of piracy under international law.23 Although there 
had been an initiative for the reform of a piracy-related provision in the 
negotiation process of UNCLOS to replace the term “on the high seas” 
with the term “anywhere in the ocean space,” this proposal did not gain 
support.24 
Providing jurisdiction only to coastal states in cases of armed 
robbery in the territorial waters and not treating such incidents as piracy 
is arguably justified considering the sovereignty of the coastal state over 
its territorial waters.25 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
has divided acts of piracy into two categories based on geographical 
division: piracy as defined in UNCLOS and a new category called 
“armed robbery.”26 The IMO defines armed robbery as “any unlawful act 
of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other 
than an act of ‘piracy,’ directed against a ship, or against persons or 
property on board such a ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over such 
offences.”27 
For the purpose of this article, the geographic limitation of the 
UNCLOS piracy definition is not a significant bottleneck in the process 
of the operationalization of the role of national courts in the global 
context. If there is a firm political will from states to operationalize the 
role of their respective national courts, the national courts can still play 
an instrumental role in combating maritime piracy and armed robbery by 
                                                 
 
21
  UNCLOS, supra note 11, art . 58(2). 
 
22
  IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Doc. MSC.4/Circ 133 (Mar. 
19, 2009). According to Robert C Beckman, “Very few of the incidents in Southeast Asia are 
‘piracy’ as defined in international law because they took place in waters under the sovereignty 
of a coastal state.” Robert C. Beckman, Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in 
Southeast Asia: The Way Forward , 33 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 317 (2002). 
 23  IMO, supra note 22. 
 
24
  Nordquist, supra note 18, at 198–99. 
 
25
  Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval 
Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. T RANSNAT’L L. 1, 18 (2007). 
 26  Zou Keyuan, New Developments in the International Law of Piracy, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 323, 
326 (2009). 
 
27
  IMO, Draft Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships, Doc. MSC/Circ984 (Dec. 20, 2000). 
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ensuring the prompt prosecution of alleged offenders. However, some 
countries may not be able to patrol their waters and prosecute pirates due 
to their financial and institutional deficiencies. In these areas, regional 
initiatives may supplement the international legal framework, which may 
provide a wider enforcement jurisdiction to regional (or extra-regional) 
countries. Article 311(3) of UNCLOS provides room for agreements by 
two or more states or agreements modifying the convention for specific 
issues based on reciprocity. This provision could be utilized in piracy-
prone regions.28 
Thus, the geographic limitation of UNCLOS’ piracy definition is 
not a significant problem because, with the consent of the coastal state, 
other states can intervene in territorial waters to combat maritime armed 
robbery. For example, the increasing occurrence of piracy and armed 
robbery off the coast of Somalia has exerted a considerable pressure on 
global trade, creating an unprecedented willingness from different states 
and organizations to participate in an anti-piracy action. The situation 
prompted the call for “one of the largest anti-piracy flotillas in modern 
history.”29 For the first time, the Security Council took action against 
                                                 
 
28
  Jesus, supra note 2, at 383. A regional convention for piracy in the Asian region, namely the 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia (ReCAAP), 
did not modify any UNCLOS provisions, but instead introduced some arrangements for 
reporting. In January 2009, countries in region adopted the Code of Conduct Concerning the 
Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the 
Gulf of Aden (the Djibouti Code of Conduct).  In June 2013, 22 countries from West and Central 
Africa adopted the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery 
against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa . Both of these are non-
legally binding documents. Another regional instrument that deals with piracy is the CARICOM 
Maritime and Airspace Security Cooperation Agreement, which was concluded between the 
member states of the Caribbean Community. The agreement identified inter alia piracy, 
hijacking, and other serious crimes as maritime security issues. The agreement provides 
permission to Security Force aircrafts or vessels of one state party to patrol t he waters and 
airspace of another state party in furtherance of the agreement. This is an example of the 
modification of an UNCLOS provision in the context of a region, which has created enforcement 
jurisdiction for member states in the territorial seas of other member states. See Regional 
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia (ReCAAP), Feb. 28, 
2005, 44 ILM 829 (2005); Djibouti Code of Conduct, 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf9/piracy-djibouti-meeting (last visited June 24, 
2010). See generally James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Combating Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The 
Djibouti Code and the Somali Coast Guard , 52 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 516 (2009); 
CARICOM Maritime and Airspace Security Cooperation Agreement, 
http://www.caricomlaw.org/ 
docs/CARICOM%20Maritime%20and%20Airspace%20Security%20Co-
operation%20Agreement.pdf (last visited June 25, 2010). 
 
29
  Defeating Piracy Requires Restoration of Law in Somalia, Ban Says, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un .org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=30225&Cr=piracy&Cr1=pirate (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2010). 
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piracy under Chapter VII of the UN Charter30 and determined that piracy 
and armed robbery in the territorial waters and high seas off the coast of 
Somalia “exacerbate the situation in Somalia which continues to 
constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region.”31 
However, piracy, or Somali piracy per se, has not been recognized as a 
threat to international peace and security. The most important aspect of 
these Security Council resolutions has been the authorization of action 
against armed robbery in the territorial waters of Somalia.32 
Some countries were concerned about any possible 
modifications of UNCLOS or customary international law by Resolution 
1816. They sought assurances in this regard in the negotiation process of 
the resolution.33 It is critical to examine whether these resolutions have in 
any event modified UNCLOS or changed the customary international 
law regarding the geographical extent of the law of piracy. These 
resolutions have not made any changes to the existing international law 
of piracy because they are limited by both ratione temporis and ratione 
loci.34 First, these resolutions are applicable for a temporary period.35 
Second, they clearly state that the authorization will only be applicable in 
Somalia and will neither amend existing conventions nor establish 
customary international law.36 Finally, they have been adopted with the 
express request from and consent of Somalia.37 This again indicates the 
important role of the national courts of coastal states for combating 
maritime armed robbery within their jurisdiction, as the international 
community is reluctant to expand the jurisdiction of other countries in 
                                                 
 
30
  S.C. Res. 1816, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008).  
 
31
  Id. Interestingly, Somalia has declared a 200 nautical mile territorial sea, which is not acceptable 
under international law. It  may create some ambiguities in naval operations. See United Nations, 
Table of Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction (as at July 31, 2010), 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/legislationandtreaties/pdffiles/table_summary_of_claims.pdf (last 
visited Sep. 1, 2010); UNCLOS, supra note 11, art . 3. 
 
32
  S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 30, ¶ 7; S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); 
S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1897, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 2020, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011). 
 
33
  See U.N. S.C., 63rd Sess., 5902d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5902 (June 2, 2008).  
 34  Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of 
Somalia, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 399, 404–05 (2009). See also M.D. Fink & Richard Galvin, 
Combating Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: Current Legal Challenges, 56 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 
367, 380 (2009). 
 
35
  S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 30, ¶ 7; S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 32, ¶ 10; S.C. Res. 1851, supra 
note 32, ¶ 6. 
 
36
  S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 30, ¶ 9; S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 32, ¶ 11; S.C. Res. 1851, supra 
note 32, ¶ 10. 
 
37
  S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 30, at 2; S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 30, at 1. 
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the territorial seas of coastal states. As will be discussed in Part II, in the 
context of Somalia, states are showing some reluctance in prosecuting 
apprehended pirates. Against this backdrop, the next issue to consider is 
whether UNCLOS has imposed an obligation to prosecute pirates by 
providing universal jurisdiction. 
B. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
UNCLOS treats pirates as hostes humani generis and provides 
universal jurisdiction to the court of the country that seizes a pirate ship.38 
As discussed above, piracy is regarded as a crime of universal 
jurisdiction39 under customary international law that has been codified by 
international treaties. Piracy is the oldest universal jurisdiction crime.40 
International treaties adopted in the twentieth century have clearly 
established universal jurisdiction for piracy.41 Pirates were already 
considered outlaws—a hostis humani generis—even before the evolution 
of modern international law.42 It has long been recognized that every 
state has prescriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdiction over all 
piratical acts on the high seas, even in the absence of any link with the 
offence, perpetrator, and victim.43 
                                                 
 
38
  UNCLOS, supra note 11, art . 105. 
 39  “ . . . universal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on nature of the crime, without 
regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, 
the nationality of victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction.” The 
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction , in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL 
COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 18, 21 
(Stephen Macedo ed., 2004). 
 40  Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 791 
(1988); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 108 (2001). According to M 
Cherif Bassiouni, “universal jurisdiction to prevent and suppress piracy has been wildly 
recognized in customary international law as the international crime per excellence to which 
universality applies.” Bassiouni, supra note 40. at 110–11. 
 41  Bassiouni, supra note 40, at 108–12; L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 559 (H. 
Lauterpacht ed., 6th ed. 1947); Dickinson, supra note 2, at 338. 
 
42
  Randall, supra note 40, at 791; Dickinson, supra note 2, at 335–39; Oppenheim, supra note 41, 
at  559. 
 
43
  MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 365 (Max Sorensen ed., 1968); Randall, supra note 
40, at 791; United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 843 (CCD Mass 1822) (No. 
15551) (stating that “vessels and property in the possession of pirates may be lawfully seized on 
the high seas by any person, and 
brought in for adjudication”). 
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Thus, national courts play a significant role in cases falling 
within universal jurisdiction.44 A state exercising universal jurisdiction 
carries out an action in the interest of public order against enemy of 
mankind on behalf of the global community.45 The purpose of doing so is 
to enhance global order by taking action against certain heinous crimes.46 
In exercising universal jurisdiction, the interests of the global community 
are apparently placed above the interests of the prosecuting state.47 
According to Article 105 of UNCLOS, any state can seize a 
pirate vessel and the courts of the capturing country have a right to try 
pirates.48 It is a longstanding customary international law that all states 
have universal jurisdiction for the apprehension and prosecution of 
pirates.49 Article 105 allows for the exercise of jurisdiction, but does not 
impose an obligation to prosecute pirates in domestic court. Instead, 
UNCLOS calls upon states to “cooperate to the fullest possible extent in 
the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State.”50 The effectiveness of this provision may be 
questioned. The International Law Commission (ILC) comments on a 
similar provision of the 1958 High Seas Convention,51 to the effect that: 
                                                 
 
44
  Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann  (Israel Sup. Ct. 1962), INT’L L. REP., 
vol. 36, 
p. 277, 1968 (English translation). 
 
45
  Bassiouni, supra note 40, at 88, 96. 
 46  Id. 
 
47
  Id. While it  is established that the universality principle grants a basis of jurisdiction to the 
prosecuting state against certain crimes, whether it  imposes an obligation on states to prosecute 
offenders for these crimes remains to be determined. Nevertheless, there is a view that, 
considering the heinousness of certain crimes, the principle of universal jurisdiction obliges the 
states to prosecute the alleged offender regardless of the location of the crime or the nationality 
of the alleged offender or the victim. The main distinction between universal jurisdiction and 
other bases of jurisdiction is that the former is based on judicial altruism. In practice, as a self-
interested political entity, states are broadly reluctant to engage in this altruism. See generally 
Eugene Kontorovich, The Inefficiency of Universal Jurisdiction, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 398 
(2008); Mary Robinson, Preface to UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE 
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 15, 16 (Stephen Macedo ed., 
2004). 
 
48
  UNCLOS, supra note 11, art . 105. 
 
49
  As observed by Justice Moore in the S.S. Lotus case: “ . . . in the case of . . . piracy by law of 
nations, there has been conceded a universal jurisdiction, under which the person charged with 
the offence may be tried and punished by any nation into whose jurisdiction he may come.” S.S. 
Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 70 (Sept. 7) (Moore, J., dissenting).  
 
50
  UNCLOS, supra note 11, art . 100. 
 
51
  Geneva  Convention on the High Seas, art . 14, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11. Article 14 of the 
High Sea Convention has been reproduced verbatim in Article 100 of UNCLOS. 
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any State having an opportunity of taking measures against piracy, 
and neglecting to do so, would be failing in a duty laid upon it  by 
international law. Obviously, the State must be allowed certain 
latitude as to the measures it should take to this end in any individual 
case.52 
Although Article 100 of UNCLOS imposes an obligation of 
cooperation for the repression of piracy on the high seas, there are doubts 
whether the convention imposes any clear obligation for the prosecution 
of pirates.53 The historical development of the piracy-related provisions 
of UNCLOS supports such an assertion.54 Article 100 originated in 
Article 18 of the Harvard Draft on Piracy,55 which states that: “the Parties 
to this convention agree to make every expedient use of their powers to 
prevent piracy, separately and in co-operation.”56 The language of this 
draft article is even stronger than the language of Article 100 of 
UNCLOS. However, the reporter of the Harvard Draft Convention, 
Joseph W Bingham, comments that: 
the draft convention does not assert a definite duty of signatories to 
seize or prosecute all pirates. It imposes on them by Article 18 only a 
general discretionary obligation to discourage piracy by exercising 
their rights of prevention and punishment as far as is expedient.57 
In fact, neither Article 100 of UNCLOS nor its predecessor, 
Article 14 in the High Seas Convention, ever intended to impose a 
positive obligation on states to prosecute pirates.58 UNCLOS did not 
make any changes and Article 14 of the High Seas Convention was 
reproduced verbatim in Article 100 of UNCLOS. Post-UNCLOS state 
practice supports the view that states always considered this obligation 
discretionary, as many states historically (and even currently) have not 
criminalized piracy jure gentium under national law.59 It is clear that the 
                                                 
 52  Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 2 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 
9, U.N. Doc A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B.  Int’l L. Comm’n 253, 282, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/104 [hereinafter Report of the International Law Commission]. 
 
53
  DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, TREATY JURISDICTION OVER PIRATES: A COMPILATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
WITH INTRODUCTORY NOTES 1 (2009). 
 
54
  Roach, supra note 20, at 405–06. 
 
55
  Joseph W. Bingham, Harvard Research in International Law: Draft Convention on Piracy, 20 
AM. J. INT’L L. (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT) 739 (1926). 
 
56
  Id. at  760. 
 
57
  Id. (emphasis added). 
 
58
  INT’L LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE HELD AT THE HAGUE AUGUST 
23RD TO AUGUST 29TH, 1970, at 738 (1971). 
 
59
  See infra Part III.B. 
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power to prosecute pirates is discretionary. UNCLOS does not impose a 
positive obligation to take proactive steps for the prosecution of pirates 
in national courts. 
The above discussion has revealed two problematic issues in 
UNCLOS, namely geographical limitation and the absence of obligation 
for the prosecution of pirates and maritime armed robbers. It also shows 
that the UN Security Council resolutions adopted in the wake of Somali 
piracy have not entirely resolved these problems. Although international 
law imposes an obligation of cooperation for the repression of piracy, it 
is doubtful whether states have an obligation for prosecuting pirates and 
thus an obligation to operationalize the role of their national courts in this 
regard. International law has largely left the issue of operationalizing the 
role of national courts to the political decisions of the states. 
Against this backdrop, the next section examines another 
important international legal instrument—the SUA Convention—to 
determine whether this treaty has made any changes in the international 
law of piracy, as well as the implications of those changes in the role of 
judicial institutions in combating piracy. In the next part, this article 
argues that the SUA Convention has introduced a more pragmatic 
approach beyond altruism by imposing obligations for the prosecution of 
pirates on states that are connected to a piratical incident in one way or 
another. 
C. PIRACY AND THE SUA CONVENTION 
After the high-profile MS Achille Lauro incident,60 the IMO 
adopted the SUA Convention, which listed a number of acts at sea, 
including seizure and unauthorized control over a ship, as unlawful and 
punishable under national laws of the parties to the convention.61 The 
SUA Convention was further amended by a protocol adopted in 
                                                 
 
60
  Terrorists belonging to the Abu Abbas faction of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) hijacked 
the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro to release some Palestinian prisoners from Israel. When Tel 
Aviv rejected their demands, they killed an American passenger on board named Leon 
Klinghoffer. The terrorists then secured an arrangement with Egypt, discharging the ship in 
return for a safe passage to Tunis. When US authorities came to know that they had killed an 
American passenger, they forced the aircraft carrying the terrorists to land in Italy. T he Achille 
Lauro incident had a far-reaching effect on the development of international law related to 
maritime terrorism. MARTIN N. MURPHY, CONTEMPORARY PIRACY AND MARITIME TERRORISM: 
T HE T HREAT TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 45 (2007). 
 
61
  SUA Convention 1988, supra note 11, art . 3. 
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2005.62The SUA Convention followed the approach of previously 
adopted terrorism conventions and thereby refrained from creating 
universal jurisdiction compared to the piracy-related provisions of 
UNCLOS and the High Seas Convention.63 There was a view from the 
proposing states that the cases covered by the proposed convention 
should be distinct from piracy.64 This approach may have been due to the 
highly political nature of maritime terrorism. 
The geographical extent of the SUA Convention is much wider 
than UNCLOS. The drafters of the SUA Convention considered two 
issues in framing the relevant provisions: first, making the geographical 
scope of the convention as wide as possible and second, creating an 
international element in the offences vis-à-vis creating jurisdiction for the 
flag state of the targeted vessel.65 Article 4 of the convention states that: 
1) This Convention applies if the ship is navigating or is scheduled to 
navigate into, through or from waters beyond the outer limit of the 
territorial sea of a single State, or the lateral limits of its territorial sea 
with adjacent States. 
2) In cases where the Convention does not apply pursuant to 
paragraph 1, it nevertheless applies when the offender or the alleged 
offender is found in the territory of a State party other than the State 
referred to in paragraph 1. 
Moreover, the SUA Convention introduced the principle of aut 
dedere aut judicare, and thereby parties to the SUA Convention are 
obligated either to prosecute the offender or extradite the offender to the 
country where they can be tried.66 
The SUA Convention provides for two types of jurisdiction: 
obligatory and discretionary. Each state party is obliged to establish 
jurisdiction over offences committed on its flagships, in its territory, and 
                                                 
 
62
  Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation , IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21 (Nov. 1, 2005) 
[hereinafter SUA Protocol 2005]. 
 63  Tullio Treves, The Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Navigation, in MARITIME TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 69, 70–71 (Natalino Ronzitti 
ed., 1990). 
 
64
  Helmut Tuerk, Combating Terrorism at Sea: The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation, in LEGAL CHALLENGES IN MARITIME SECURITY 41, 45 (Myron 
H. Nordquist ed., 2008). There was serious debate as to whether an incident like the Achille 
Lauro could be treated as piracy. 
 
65
  T reves, supra note 63, at 73. 
 
66
  SUA Convention 1988, supra note 11, art . 10. 
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by its nationals.67 A state party may establish jurisdiction if an offence is 
committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence is that state; 
during the commission of the offence, a national of the state is injured, 
threatened or killed; or, the offence is committed in an attempt to compel 
the state to do, or to abstain, from performing any act.68 Once the alleged 
offender is in its territory, the state party is obliged to establish 
jurisdiction over offences if it does not extradite the offender to another 
country that has established jurisdiction under the above-mentioned 
provisions.69 
The SUA Convention did not provide any additional powers to 
state parties for the interdiction and boarding of ships or for the arrest of 
offenders.70 A key problem may be apprehending offenders rather than 
prosecuting them, as the SUA Convention failed to incorporate any 
provision similar to articles 105 and 110 of UNCLOS.71 Although Article 
8bis of the SUA Protocol 2005 makes some provision for boarding 
vessels and the detention of suspected terrorists, the provision is largely 
based on either an advanced optional declaration or the ad hoc consent of 
the flag state.72 Moreover, as of July 31, 2013, this protocol only had 
twenty-four state parties.73 However, this is not a problem for piracy, as 
UNCLOS already gives states sufficient jurisdiction to apprehend foreign 
vessels in the case of piracy.74 
Although enforcement jurisdiction under the SUA Convention is 
limited in scope, it is nevertheless important as it imposes an obligation 
to prosecute. It is, therefore, critical to determine whether the SUA 
Convention will be applicable in the case of piracy, as defined by the 
                                                 
 
67
  SUA Convention 1988, supra note 11, art . 6(1). 
 
68
  SUA Convention 1988, supra note 11, art . 6(2). 
 
69
  SUA Convention 1988, supra note 11, art . 10. 
 
70
  Robert Beckman, The 1988 SUA Convention and 2005 SUA Protocol; Tools to Combat Piracy, 
Armed Robbery and Maritime Terrorism, in LLOYD’S MIU HANDBOOK OF MARITIME SECURITY 
189 (Robert Herbert -Burns et al., 2009). 
 
71
  According to Article 105 of UNCLOS, “On the high seas, or in any other place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken 
by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on 
board.” Again, Article 110 of UNCLOS allows for boarding of a foreign ship by a warship if that 
ship is engaged in piracy. 
 
72
  See SUA Protocol 2005, supra note 62, 8 bis. 
 
73
  IMO, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the International 
Maritime Organization or Its Secretary General Performs Depositary or other Functions, 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20 -
%202013.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2013). 
 
74
  UNCLOS, supra note 11, art . 105. 
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UNCLOS. This is a very important issue in relation to state responsibility 
for the prosecution of pirates. If the SUA Convention is applicable for 
piracy, states will be obligated to either prosecute or extradite captured 
pirates. The travaux préparatoires of the SUA Convention indicates that 
the drafters intended to create this legal regime primarily for maritime 
terrorism incidents such as the Achille Lauro.75 Joyner notes that the 
offences set forth in the SUA Convention are distinct from the traditional 
international crime of piracy.76 According to Helmut Tuerk there was an 
intention to make a clear distinction between cases covered by the SUA 
Convention and piracy.77 However, this does not necessarily make 
offences mutually exclusive under the SUA Convention and piracy. A 
plain reading of the unlawful acts listed in the SUA Convention clearly 
reveals that some types of piratical acts may qualify as an offence under 
the SUA Convention.78 José Luis Jesus is of the view that the 1988 SUA 
Convention seems “to apply to piracy or armed robbery against ships.”79 
The UN Security Council has endorsed this applicability of the SUA 
Convention.80 Contemporary writings support the application of the SUA 
Convention to some types of piratical acts,81 and the application of the 
convention has been recognized by a recent decision of a domestic 
                                                 
 
75
  T reves, supra note 63, at 70–71. 
 
76
  Christopher C. Joyner, Suppression of Terrorism on the High Seas: The 1988 IMO Convention 
on the Safety of Maritime Navigation , 19 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 343, 348 (1989). 
 
77
  Tuerk, supra note 64, at 49–50. 
 78  Jesus, supra note 2, at 381. 
 
79
  Id. 
 
80
  In Resolution 1846 regarding Somali piracy the Council notes: “ . . . that the 1988 Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA 
Convention”) provides for parties to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept 
delivery of persons responsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising control over a ship by 
force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; urges States party to th e SUA 
Convention to fully implement their obligations under said Convention and cooperate with the 
Secretary-General and the IMO to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of 
persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.” S.C. Res. 1846, 
supra note 32, ¶ 15. 
 
81
  See Roach, supra note 20, at 407–08; GUILFOYLE, supra note 53, at 12–17; Douglas Guilfoyle, 
Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 141, 149 (2010); 
Christopher Totten & Matthew Bernal, Somali Piracy: Jurisdictional Issues, Enforcement 
Problems and Potential Solutions, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 377, 397 (2010); Barry Hart Dubner & 
Karen Greene, On the Creation of a New Legal Regime to Try Sea Pirates, 41 J. MAR. L. & COM. 
439, 450 (2010); Yvonne M Dutton, Bringing Pirates to Justice: A Case for Including Piracy 
within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 208–09 
(2010); George D Gabel, Jr., Smoother Seas Ahead: The Draft Guidelines As An International 
Solution To Modern-Day Piracy 81 T UL. L. REV. 1433, 1445 (2007). 
KARIM_PROOF (DO NO T DELETE)  9/4/2014   6:49 PM 
118 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
court.82 Consequently, parties to the SUA Convention have an 
international obligation to prosecute or extradite suspected pirates and 
armed robbers under its terms. 
An offence may be qualified as an unlawful act under the SUA 
Convention at the same time as piracy under UNCLOS.83 However, 
every incident of piracy may not be qualified as a SUA Convention 
offence. An incident of theft by one vessel against another, without 
endangering the safety of a vessel, may be treated as depredation and 
hence as piracy under UNCLOS, but it will not qualify as a SUA 
Convention offence.84 
The important question to answer is whether the SUA 
Convention imposes an obligation on member states to operationalize the 
role of their national courts for the prosecution of pirates, and the answer 
is yes. Unlike UNCLOS, the SUA Convention does not leave the 
question to the political determination of member states. The SUA 
Convention’s obligation to extradite or prosecute clearly imposes an 
obligation on states to take affirmative action to operationalize the role of 
their respective national courts. Parties to the SUA Convention are 
thereby obligated either to prosecute alleged offenders or extradite them 
to the country where they can be tried if the alleged offender is found in 
its territory.85 
Article 5 of the SUA Convention imposes an obligation on states 
to make the offences under this convention “punishable by appropriate 
penalties.”86 Article 8 allows the master of a ship of a state party (the 
“flag state”) to deliver a suspected offender to the authorities of any other 
state (the “receiving state”) and the receiving state in turn may request 
the flag state to accept delivery of that person.87 The flag state is obliged 
to show reason if it is not willing to receive the person.88 Article 8 
imposes certain rights and obligations on the flag state of the vessel 
where an offender or alleged offender is held. The flag state may instruct 
the master of the vessel to deliver the person to the nearest country. If the 
                                                 
 
82
  LJN, BM8116, Rotterdam District Court, 10/600012-09 (July 17, 2010), 
http://www.unicri.it /maritime_piracy/docs/Netherlands_2010_Crim_No_10_6000_12_09%20Ju
dgment.pdf (last visited July 15, 2012) [hereinafter LJN: BM8116, Rotterdam District Court].  
 
83
  Beckman, supra note 70, at 189. 
 
84
  GUILFOYLE, supra note 53, at 14. 
 
85
  SUA Convention 1988, supra note 11, art . 10. 
 86  SUA Convention 1988, supra note 11, art . 5. 
 
87
  T reves, supra note 63, at 80–81. 
 
88
  SUA Convention 1988, supra note 11, art . 8(5). 
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master does so, then the flag state has an obligation to accept that person 
from the receiving state. If the flag state instructs its officials to release 
the alleged offender without taking any legal action, it may be a violation 
of its obligations under Articles 5 and 8 of the SUA Convention. 
Overall, it appears that UNCLOS does not impose a positive 
obligation to prosecute pirates. However, the SUA Convention imposes 
such an obligation on states that are linked with the attacked vessel, 
victim or suspected pirate, as well as states where the pirate is found. 
UNCLOS, the SUA Convention, and the Security Council resolutions 
together provide sufficient jurisdiction and power for the enforcement 
action and prosecution of pirates.89 Thus, the absence of a strong, positive 
obligation for prosecution under UNCLOS is not a serious hurdle if 
states have the political will to apprehend and prosecute Somali pirates 
                                                 
 
89
  Apart from UNCLOS, the SUA Convention and above-mentioned UN Security Council 
resolutions, some other conventions, such as the International Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages 1979 [hereinafter Hostages Convention], and the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organised Crime 2000 [hereinafter UNTOC], may also be applicable for some 
types of maritime crimes that may also be classified as piracy. See GUILFOYLE, supra note 53, at 
27, 34. According to Article 1(1) of the Hostages Convention: “ [a]ny person who seizes or 
detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred 
to as the ‘hostage’) in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international 
intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or 
abstain from doing any act as an explicit  or implicit  condition for the release of the hostage 
commits the offence of taking of hostages.” Id. at  29. The Hostages Convention also makes 
attempting and abetting the above activities an offence. See id. 
It  is arguable that the Somali pirates and those helping Somali pirates may be treated as hostage-
takers under this convention. The UNTOC Convention is applicable when an organized criminal 
group, consisting of three or more people, engage in a crime expressly set out under the 
convention as a “serious crime” punishable by at least four years deprivation of liberty or more 
serious penalty. Id. at  34. The crime must be transnational in nature. Id. It must be asked whether 
an incident occurring on the high seas can be treated as a transnational crime under this 
convention. Id. According to Article 15(1)(b), a state is obliged to establish jurisdiction if “ [t]he 
offence is committed on board a vessel that is flying the flag of that State Party or an aircraft that 
is registered under the laws of that State Party at the time that the offence is committed.” Id. at  
40. It  can be assumed that this convention is applicable to flag state vessels on the high seas also. 
Id. at  34. This convention may also be applicable in a situation where planning for piracy is done 
in one country and the piratical act is carried out on the high seas. Id. These conventions also 
require states parties to criminalize offenses covered within the conventions. See International 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages art. 1(1), 1(2), December 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T .S. 
205; United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime arts. 2(b), 3(1)(b), 
15(1)(b), Dec. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209; International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 229. J. Ashley Roach is of the opinion that 
the Terrorism Financing Convention may also be applicable. The convention makes it  an offence 
to finance certain crimes under international law, including offences under the SUA Convention 
and the Hostages Convention. He observed that “The methods and processes by which ransoms 
are paid to the pirates operating off the coast of Somalia seem to fit  squarely within these 
definitions.” Roach, supra note 20, at 408. 
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or pirates in other regions. Through Resolution 1950, the Security 
Council strongly reminds UN member states of the need for the domestic 
implementation of these conventions. Unfortunately, many countries 
have failed to implement relevant international legal instruments in their 
domestic legal frameworks. Without proactive and positive steps from 
the state parties to these conventions for full implementation within their 
domestic legal systems, combating piracy off the coast of Somalia or in 
other parts of the world will be very difficult. 
Against this backdrop, Part II presents a case study on Somalia 
to determine the extent to which states are interested in taking practical 
action to operationalize the role of their national judicial institutions. As 
stated earlier, piracy off the coast of Somalia has created doubts about 
the effectiveness of the present international legal framework. An 
elaborate discussion on Somali piracy is not only needed to determine 
the present trend, but also to find a long-term solution to the problem. 
II. THE WINTER OF DESPAIR AND THE SPRING OF HOPE: A CASE 
STUDY ON SOMALI PIRACY 
With some limitations, international law has arguably provided a 
workable legal framework for the prosecution of pirates. However, the 
situation in Somalia has revealed some practical difficulties in the 
prosecution of pirates under the current international legal setting. 
Somali piracy has not only exposed the practical problems, but also 
proved the ongoing relevance of academic discussions on 
operationalizing the role of national courts for the prosecution of pirates. 
A case study on Somali piracy is useful for identifying the future 
direction for the prosecution of pirates around the world. Although it 
may appear that the situation in Somalia is unique, it in some respects 
represents the global scenario. It is likely that threats of piracy in some 
other regions will become as serious as Somali piracy. For example, the 
Security Council has adopted two resolutions expressing its deep concern 
about the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.90 
                                                 
 
90
  S.C. Res. 2018, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2018 (Oct. 31, 2011); S.C. Res. 2039, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2039 
(Feb. 29, 2012). The Security Council, “[u]rges States of the region of the Gulf of Guinea to take 
prompt action, at national and regional levels with the support of the international community 
where able, and by mutual agreement, to develop and implement national maritime security 
strategies, including for the establishment of a legal framework for the prevention, and 
repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea and as well as prosecution of persons engaging in 
those crimes, and punishment of those convicted of those crimes and encourages regional 
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The situation in Somalia not only reveals an ineffective legal 
order in Somalia, but also exposes the inadequate domestic legal 
arrangements for prosecution, even in some leading developed countries. 
It also indicates a serious limitation of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction in practical terms. Universal jurisdiction has proven to be 
insufficient in ensuring the prosecution of all pirates. 
As mentioned earlier, the UN Security Council authorizes the 
use of all necessary means against Somali pirates.91 However, most of the 
states participating in the anti-piracy action in the Gulf of Aden are 
unwilling to prosecute Somali pirates on the capturing state’s home soil92 
and are not interested in applying universal jurisdiction; rather, they are 
playing a game of catch and release. According to the Report of the 
Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to 
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, “some cases of repeat offending have 
been identified, where the pirates apprehended had already been released 
on previous occasions for lack of a host State to prosecute them. Thus, 
more than 90 per cent of the pirates apprehended by States patrolling the 
seas will be released without being prosecuted.”93 This is mainly due to 
the unavailability of national courts in the region, as it is unrealistic to 
expect that warships of countries far away from the region to go off-
station and travel thousands of miles to their home countries in order to 
transfer the pirates for prosecution. In some rare cases of piracy, where 
the interest of the capturing countries was clearly threatened, pirates have 
been brought to the capturing country for trial.94 Prosecuting pirates 
appears to be more difficult than catching them.95 However, there is 
currently a growing awareness among states in this regard. 
                                                 
cooperation in this regard.” Id. ¶ 5. See also Eero Tepp, The Gulf of Guinea: Military and Non-
Military Ways of Combatting Piracy, 14 BALTIC SEC. & DEF. 181 (2012); Int’l Crisis Group, The 
Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone, Africa Report No. 195 (December 12, 2012). 
 
91
  SC Res 1816, supra note 30, ¶ 7. 
 
92
  Special Adviser Report, supra note 10. 
 
93
  Id. at  13. 
 
94
  Somali ‘pirate’ to be tried in US, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8003936.stm, (last 
visited June 27, 2010); Toby Sterling, Dutch Court Sentences Five Somali Pirates to Five Years, 
T HE GUARDIAN, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world /feedarticle/9131897 (last visited June 27, 
2010); Kim Landers, Eleven Somalis Appear in US Court on Piracy Charges,  ABC News, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-04-24/somalis-appear-in-us-court-on-piracy-charges/408776 
(last visited June 27, 2010); Matthew Kang, Somali Pirates to Face Trial in Germany, 
DeutsheWelle (May 13, 2010), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5464451,00.html; Peter 
Sedik, Five Somalis Sentenced in Europe’s First Pirate Trial, Epoch T imes (June 17, 2010), 
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/world/somali-pirate-trial-37611.html (all these trials involved 
an attack on the prosecuting country’s ship). 
 
95
  Kontorovich, supra note 7, at  244–46. 
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There are some practical difficulties in prosecuting pirates under 
the current international legal regime. Prosecution may create a complex 
legal scenario involving different branches of international law. The 
main concerns of the arresting states are that the pirates may face the 
death penalty or inhuman treatment in Somalia if they are extradited and, 
if they are prosecuted in the arresting state, they may seek asylum after 
serving the sentence.96 For example, on September 17, 2008, a Danish 
naval ship captured ten pirates off the coast of Somalia. After six days of 
detention, the Danish government freed the pirates; they were not 
extradited to Somalia because the Danish authority suspected they would 
face the death penalty,97 and Danish law does not permit extradition if 
there is any possibility of the death penalty.98 Denmark did not prosecute 
the criminals because it would be difficult to deport them back to 
Somalia after serving the sentence.99 
It has been argued by some commentators that although 
UNCLOS provides for a universal jurisdiction, international human 
rights and humanitarian law have created some constraints on the 
prosecution of Somali pirates.100 This problem shows that the application 
of UNCLOS may be restrained by other branches of international law—a 
legal complexity that was seemingly not contemplated by the drafters of 
the convention. 
Contemporary commentary has canvased three options for the 
prosecution of pirates: first, prosecution in the capturing state; second, 
prosecution in a third state of the particular region; and third, creating 
one or more international or hybrid judicial institutions for prosecution.101 
The prosecution of pirates in their home country may not appear to be a 
viable option in the case of Somalia, as there is no effective central 
government in the country. However, the prosecution of pirates in their 
home country may be a viable option for many other piracy-prone 
regions, including Southeast Asia. Despite the absence of an effective 
                                                 
 
96
  Id. at  267. 
 
97
  T reves, supra note 7, at 408. 
 
98
  Id. 
 
99
  Id. 
 100  See generally Kontorovich, supra note 7; Michael H. Passman, Protections Afforded to 
Captured Pirates Under the Law of War and International Law, 33 T UL. MAR. L.J. 1 (2008); 
GUILFOYLE, supra note 81, at 152–67. 
 
101
  Fink & Galvin, supra note 34, at 389-95; Kontorovich, supra note 7; Treves, supra note 37. 
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central government, Somalia is the largest prosecutor of Somali pirates.102 
Thus, prosecuting pirates in their own country is not a failed proposition 
in practical terms. 
Initially, in his 2010 report, the UN Secretary-General identified 
seven options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning Somali 
pirates and armed robbers.103  These options are broadly divided into two 
categories: international and national courts.  International courts include 
options for the establishment of an international or regional court.  
National courts refer to national courts and those with external 
participation. In a recently adopted resolution, the UN Security Council 
clearly showed its interest in a specialized national court (or an 
internationalized national court).104  However, is a specialized national 
court the best option? 
A. IS AN INTERNATIONAL OR REGIONAL COURT THE ANSWER? 
The international legal system is fully dependent on national 
courts for the prosecution of pirates. There are some benefits in relying 
on national courts for the prosecution of crimes with international 
significance, including the collection of evidence, using the same 
language of the defendants and their counsel, and close proximity to 
victims.105 However, in the case of the prosecution of pirates, even this 
benefit may not be available all the time. For example, if a Somali pirate 
is prosecuted in a national court of the United States under universal 
jurisdiction for attacking a Japanese vessel, none of the above-mentioned 
benefits will be available in that trial. In the wake of Somali piracy, some 
                                                 
 
102
  U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Specialized Anti-piracy Courts in 
Somalia and other States in the Region , 5 U.N. Doc. S/2012/50 (Jan. 20, 2012) [hereinafter 
Secretary General Report 2012].. 
 103  These options are: 1)  Prosecution in regional States,  2) A new Somali court sitt ing in the 
territory of a third State in the region,  3)  A new special chamber within the national jurisdiction 
of a State or States in the region, without the participation of the United Nations, 4) A new 
special chamber within the national jurisdiction of a State or States in the region, with the 
participation of the United Nations, 5) A new regional tribunal through a regional treaty, 6) A 
new international tribunal on the basis of an agreement between a State in the region and the 
United Nations, 7) A new international tribunal established by the Security Council resolution 
like the ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia]. Secretary General 
Report 2010, supra note 10, at 1–2. 
 
104
  S.C. Res. 2015, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2015 (Oct. 24, 2011).  
 
105
  Antonio Cassese, The Rationale for International Criminal Justice, in T HE OXFORD 
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 123 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009). See also, 
Dutton, supra note 81, at 223; William W Burke-White, Regionalization of International 
Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 T EX. INT’L L.J. 729, 734 (2003). 
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researchers and practitioners are proposing the creation of an 
international judicial institution for the prosecution of Somali pirates.106 
There are even proposals for creating a permanent international judicial 
forum for the prosecution of pirates.107 
There are several reasons for proposing this type of court. First, 
most of the countries currently participating in anti-piracy actions in the 
Gulf of Aden are from outside of the African region. It is unreasonably 
cumbersome for them to bring a captured pirate to their own territory for 
prosecution. Moreover, states showed a clear unwillingness to prosecute 
captured pirates in their national courts. Second, an international court 
may also resolve questions of the possible violation of human rights of 
the accused in the regional prosecuting states as well as the uncertain 
legal status of transferring pirates to a third party by the capturing state. 
The constitution of the proposed court may clearly authorize such a 
transfer. Finally, there is scope to create the jurisdiction for the 
prosecution of armed robbers who are engaged in violence within the 
territorial waters of Somalia. This is a very important issue while 
Somalia’s judicial system is unreliable because of the lack of an effective 
government in the country and the question of non-refoulement due to 
the probable violation of human rights of the accused within Somalia. 
The Secretary-General identified an option for establishing an 
international tribunal based on an agreement between a state in the 
region and the UN.108 This tribunal may be established along the lines of 
UN-assisted tribunals such as the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).109 The SCSL is a hybrid 
judicial institution with the jurisdiction to try violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in Sierra Leone between November 30, 
1996 and January 16, 2002.110 Its territorial jurisdiction is limited to 
within the boundary of Sierra Leone, and its temporal jurisdiction is 
limited to a specific time span, which is notably a period before its 
establishment.111 It mainly sits in Sierra Leone, with offices in the Hague 
                                                 
 
106
  Dubner & Greene, supra note 81, at 463. 
 107  ELIZABETH ANDERSEN, BENJAMIN BROCKMAN-HAWE & PATRICIA GOFF, SUPPRESSING 
MARITIME P IRACY: EXPLORING THE OPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2009). 
 
108
  Secretary General Report 2010, supra note 10, at 33–35. 
 
109
  Id. 
 110  Stephen J. Rapp, The Compact Model in International Criminal Justice: The Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 11, 12 (2008–2009). See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1315 (2000). 
 
111
  Rapp, supra note 110, at 12. 
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and New York.112 The applicable law of the SCSL is the international 
criminal law and Sierra Leonean law.113 The STL was established 
through a Security Council resolution114 that implemented an agreement 
between the UN and Lebanon for the prosecution of the perpetrators who 
killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and performed 
other connected attacks.115 The applicable law of the STL is the Lebanese 
law.116 This court deals with an issue that mainly concerns Lebanese 
criminal law.117 
For considerable practical reasons, the establishment of an 
international tribunal in Somalia may not be a viable option. However, 
an UN-assisted international tribunal could be established in another 
country in the region, preferably one that is already prosecuting Somali 
pirates that are apprehended by patrolling states. One advantage of such a 
court is that, with the participation of UN-nominated judges and 
prosecutors, concerns about the violation of international human rights 
laws and the standards of due process can be eliminated, or at least 
reduced. If the tribunal is established under an agreement between the 
UN and the host states, the main basis of jurisdiction from the 
perspective of international law will be the universal jurisdiction regime 
as established by UNCLOS. However, this type of court may not be 
suitable for the prosecution of Somali pirates due to other jurisdictional 
problems, which will be discussed at the end of this section. 
Another option for the prosecution of pirates captured in the Gulf 
of Aden region is the establishment of an ad hoc international tribunal in 
a regional state through a Security Council resolution.118 The court could 
be modeled on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and hosted by a state under a special agreement with 
the UN. The easiest way would be to establish the tribunal as a 
subsidiary organ of the Security Council, with judicial power similar to 
the ICTY.119 The Security Council may adopt a resolution to this effect. 
                                                 
 
112
  RUTH MACKENZIE, CESARE P.R. ROMANO & YUVAL SHANY WITH PHILIPPE SANDS, PROJECT 
ON INT’L COURTS & TRIBUNALS, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND T RIBUNALS 212 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2010) (1999). 
 113  Rapp, supra note 110, at 22. 
 
114
  S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). 
 
115
  Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon , 5 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1125, 1125-26 (2007). 
 
116
  Id. 
 117  Id. 
 
118
  Secretary General Report 2010, supra note 10, at 35–36. 
 
119
  S.C. Res 827, U.N. Doc S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
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However, questions may arise as to whether the establishment of such a 
tribunal through a resolution of the Security Council is legal; that is, does 
the Security Council have the power to establish such a tribunal? 
The Security Council does have significant power to take action 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter if there is an existence of any threat 
to the peace or breach of the peace.120 In the ICTY, it was challenged by 
one accused that the constitution of the tribunal through a resolution of 
the Security Council was illegal.121 The defense contended in the Tadic 
case that the tribunal should have been created either by a treaty or by an 
amendment of the UN Charter and that the Security Council had no 
power to create a judicial institution. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY 
responded that the Security Council has wide discretion under Article 39 
of the UN Charter122 and it finally decided that the ICTY had been 
lawfully established as a measure under Chapter VII of the charter.123 
From the experience of the ICTY, it can be arguably concluded 
that the Security Council will be able to lawfully establish an ad hoc 
judicial institution for the prosecution of Somali pirates. However, one 
particular problem the ICTY has faced is a crisis of legitimacy.124 The 
General Assembly was initially not happy with the establishment of the 
tribunal by the Security Council and did not allocate any budget to the 
ICTY in its first year.125 However, the widespread effects of Somali 
piracy on the global economy may lead the General Assembly to take a 
different approach in the case of the proposed tribunal for the 
prosecution of Somali pirates. As Somalia itself is most likely to agree 
with this arrangement, the proposed tribunal may not face a legitimacy 
crisis as the ICTY did. 
For all of these options, the Security Council could adopt a 
resolution authorizing states to transfer suspected parties to the relevant 
court or tribunal for prosecution to remove any concern over the legality 
of such an action. The transfer of pirates to these tribunals could also be 
possible without such expressed authorization under universal 
                                                 
 120  U.N. Charter art . 39. 
 
121
  Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 28–32 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia). 
 
122
  Id. 
 
123
  Id. ¶ 40. 
 
124
  Gregory P. Lombardi, Legitimacy and the Expanding Power of the ICTY, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
887 (2002–2003); see generally Mark A Drumb, Looking Up, Down and Across: The ICTY’s 
Place in the International Legal Order, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1037 (2002–2003). 
 
125
  MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL: T ESTING THE 
LEGALITY OF ITS ACTS 123 (1994). 
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jurisdiction. However, Security Council authorization will remove any 
doubt. 
Nevertheless, some jurisdictional issues remain in following the 
models of the ICTY, the SCSL, and the STL. All of these courts were 
established with a very clear geographical and temporal jurisdiction. All 
of these tribunals have the jurisdiction to try incidents committed at a 
specific place and during a specific period. The jurisdiction ratione 
materie, ratione temporis, ratione loci, and ratione personae are very 
clear in the case of these tribunals. However, Somali piracy is a very 
different phenomenon. 
Identifying ratione materie may not be very problematic for the 
proposed tribunal by including maritime piracy and armed robbery 
within the jurisdiction of the court. However, determination of the 
ratione personae or personal jurisdiction of the court will be very 
difficult. If only Somali pirates are included within the jurisdiction of the 
proposed court, it will create some practical problems. First, in each case, 
the court must determine whether the person is a national of Somalia. In 
the absence of an effective central government in the country, it will be 
difficult for the prosecution to present any reliable government 
documents in this regard. Then, if non-Somali citizens are engaged in 
piratical activities in the region, the proposed court will not able to 
prosecute them. 
The issue of ratione loci jurisdiction may also be a problematic 
issue for the proposed court. The ratione loci jurisdiction of the above 
three tribunals is very specific and confined to a certain country. 
However, the geographical reach of Somali piracy is gradually 
expanding far beyond the East African coast,126 even as far as Oman’s 
waters.127 According to Jack Lang, Special Adviser to the Secretary-
General on Legal Issues related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, there 
is a wide “geographical expansion of attacks to the entire Indian Ocean. 
Such attacks, long restricted to the north, today reach the southern and 
eastern Indian Ocean up to 1,500 kilometres off the coast.”128 Thus, the 
determination of the ratione loci jurisdiction of the proposed court is 
complicated. The question of the jurisdiction of the ratione temporis is 
equally problematic. The jurisdiction ratione temporis of the ICTY, the 
                                                 
 
126
  Somali Pirates ‘Expanding Reach’, BBC News (June 10, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8093213.stm. 
 
127
  Pirates Expand to Oman’s Waters, BBC News (June 12, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8098365.stm. 
 
128
  U.N.S.C. Rep. of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6473, (Jan. 5, 2011).  
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SCSL, and the STL is for a very specific period. There is currently no 
end date for Somali piracy. 
Another of the options suggested by the Secretary-General’s 
report is the establishment of a new regional court based on a multilateral 
agreement among regional states with the participation of the UN.129 
There is no significant legal obstacle in establishing this type of court. 
However, it will require consultation and arrangement among regional 
states, which may take some time. Moreover, many of the stakeholder 
states are not from the African region. How they can transfer pirates to a 
regional court for prosecution to which they are not party would need to 
be addressed. Although the geographical extent of Somali piracy may be 
confined to the regional boundary of Africa, its effects are global. There 
may be one argument that extra-regional countries may also want to 
participate in a regional court; however, it would be better to establish an 
international court to avoid jurisdictional uncertainties. 
Somali piracy is strong evidence in support of the central 
argument of this article—that the operationalization of national courts is 
the only viable answer to the problem. From the recent UN Security 
Council proceedings, it is clear that the Security Council is willing to 
ensure the prosecution of Somali pirates through national courts in the 
region with substantial international participation and support.130 The idea 
of establishing an international tribunal such as the ICTY or a regional 
court, therefore, appears to have been abandoned. Although detailed 
reasoning of the Security Council’s decision was not publicly disclosed, 
it can be assumed that the Security Council decided that the means of 
prosecution thorough national courts outweighed the establishment of an 
international or regional court, or that the disadvantages of an 
international or regional court were too great to create an effective 
regime. 
B. IS THERE A REAL LEGAL OBSTACLE IN PROSECUTING SOMALI 
PIRATES IN NATIONAL COURTS? 
The first legal obstacle identified by a commentator is that the 
Somali pirates “could perhaps claim combatant status with its attendant 
                                                 
 
129
  Secretary General Report 2010, supra note 10, at 4. 
 
130
  S.C. Res. 2015, supra note 104. 
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Geneva Convention protections.”131 However, this argument appears to 
be unsustainable in the case of Somali piracy because the Third Geneva 
Convention is only applicable in cases of declared war or any other 
armed conflict and the Somali piracy is neither an armed conflict nor a 
declared war.132 There is an assumption that Somali pirate groups initially 
evolved to save the fishing resources of Somalia from illegal foreign 
fishing and the dumping of hazardous waste in the absence of an 
effective central government.133 The ILC observed that piracy “may be 
                                                 
 
131
  Kontorovich, supra note 7, at 259. As per Article 4(a)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, 
irregular militants, organized resistance movements, and other volunteer corps may qualify as 
prisoners of war (POW). In this view, Somali pirates may qualify as POWs because they have a 
local command structure, openly carry arms, and have a mechanism to peacefully handle 
significant amounts of ransom. Although they do not observe all rules or customs of war, they 
mostly treat their hostages reasonably. It has been argued that one particular problem may arise 
in the prosecution of pirates: they may claim a special hearing to determine their status of POW. 
Under the Third Geneva Convention, if there is a doubt about their belligerent status, they are 
entitled to enjoy the status of POW until there is a determination from a competent tribunal. 
Kontorovich, supra note 7, at 259, 262; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T . 3316, 75 U.N.T .S. 135 [hereinafter Third 
Geneva Convention]. 
 
132
  Third Geneva Convention, supra note 131, at art. 2.  According to an opinion paper published 
by the ICRC: 
International armed conflicts exist whenever there is resort to armed force between two or more 
States. 
Non-international armed conflicts are protracted armed confrontations occurring between 
governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups 
arising on the territory of a State [party to the Geneva Conventions]. The armed confrontation 
must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a 
minimum of organisation. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), How is the Term 
“Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law? , 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/armed-conflict-article-170308.htm 
(emphasis added) (last visited Nov. 2, 2010). 
 First, Somali piracy and action against Somali pirates by the international anti-piracy force cannot 
be treated as an international armed conflict, as it  does not concern two states. Most of the anti-
piracy operations occur in international waters outside of Somali territory, so this excludes any 
prima facie case in favor of the proposition that the pirates are entitled to claim a special hearing 
to determine POW status. It may be misleadingly argued that action within the Somali territorial 
waters may qualify as an internal armed conflict. However, it  is merely a law enforcement 
operation with the prior consent of the Somali government. The Security Council resolutions 
have been adopted with the express consent and request of the Somali government.  
 
133
  T ED DAGNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33911, SOMALIA: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND 
PROSPECTS FOR A LASTING PEACE 15 (2011), available at 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33911.pdf; Paul Salopek, Off the Lawless Coast of Somalia, 
Questions of Who is Pirating Whom , CHICAGO T RIBUNE (Oct. 10, 2008), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-10-10/news/0810090770_1_somalia-ground-for-
industrial-waste-pirates; Julio Godoy, Somalia: Questions Abound about EU’s ‘Combating’ of 
Piracy, INTER PRESS SERV. (June 16, 2010), http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/06/somalia-questions-
abound-about-eursquos-combating-of-piracy/; Press Release, Security Council, Security Council 
Stresses Long-Term Solution Needed to Problem of Prosecuting, Imprisoning Pirates Operating 
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prompted by feelings of hatred or revenge and not merely by the desire 
for gain.”134 If an incident qualifies as piracy under the international law 
of the sea, a remote or distant relationship between that incident and 
armed conflict cannot make a pirate a POW.135 It appears that discussion 
on the POW issue in the case of Somali pirates is best regarded as 
irrelevant. In fact, there is no practical example that pirate has claimed 
POW status in any ongoing or completed prosecutions. 
Another legal obstacle is that there may be a long period of 
detention for pirates before they are presented to a court, as it may take 
several weeks to bring arrested pirates to the territory of the arresting 
state. In two cases before the European Court of Human Rights , a 
question was asked regarding whether the detention of a suspected drug 
smuggler in the arresting vessel for two weeks before appearing in a 
court is compatible with Article 5(3) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which provides that arrested or detained persons “shall be 
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to 
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable 
time or to release pending trial.”136 In these cases, the court decided that 
this long delay might be permissible in these particular cases because of 
the wholly exceptional circumstances.137 Similarly, this issue was raised 
                                                 
off Somalia Coast, Welcomes Report on Issue, U.N. Press Release SC/10014 (Aug. 25, 2010), 
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc10014.doc.htm. 
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  Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 52, at 282. 
 
135
  As observed by one commentator: 
[i]magine persons displaced by civil war (not insurgents) cross a land border and begin hijacking 
trucks, to make a living following the destruction of their farm lands. In such a case we would 
not seriously contend that such displaced persons were in any sense acting as belligerents. 
Douglas Guilfoyle, The Laws of War and the Fight against Somali Piracy: Combatants or 
Criminals?, 11 MELB. J. INT’L L. 141, (2010). However, most of the victims of piracy incidents 
are oil tankers that are not connected with illegal fishing or the dumping of waste. Clearly, 
pirates do not only attack the vessels of countries against which they have an allegation of illegal 
fishing and waste dumping. Rather, the intention of Somali pirates is clearly ransom. Even if 
Somali piracy originated as a protest against illegal fishing and dumping of wastes, people 
involved with these activities still qualify as pirates and cannot be treated as POWs. They are 
engaged in piratical acts for financial incentives, without any direct relation to the attainment of 
any political aim, so they should be treated as pirates. List of Ships Attacked by Somalian Pirates 
Since 2009 (April 23, 2009), http://coordination-maree-noire.eu/spip.php?article9780&lang=en; 
Jeffrey Gettleman, Somali Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money, N.Y. T IMES 
(September 30, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/world/africa/01pirates.html?_r=0. 
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  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 5, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T .S. 222. 
 
137
  The Court observed in the Rigopoulos case that “having regard to the wholly exceptional 
circumstances of the instant case, the time which elapsed between placing the applicant in 
detention and bringing him before the investigating judge cannot be said to have breached the 
requirement of promptness in paragraph 3 of Article 5.’ Rigopoulos v. Spain, App. No. 
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in the Distract Court of Rotterdam in a piracy prosecution case where the 
defense lawyer claimed that, by presenting suspected pirates before the 
magistrate forty days after the arrest, the prosecution violated Article 
5(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the court 
was of the opinion that there was no reason to decide that the breach of 
procedural rules found in this matter would have affected the right of the 
suspect to a fair trial.138 
A problematic legal obstacle for developed capturing countries 
appears to be the risk that pirates may claim asylum.139 According to the 
relevant European human rights law, Somali pirates may qualify as 
refugees because of the routine brutality of the Somali government.140 
Western countries may be deemed as lucrative destinations for Somali 
pirates to claim asylum and eventual residence. However, an arguably 
better view is that this issue is not a serious obstacle in prosecuting 
pirates in Western developed countries. Considering the serious nature of 
contemporary piracy, developed countries could change their domestic 
laws and make piracy a punishable offence with a longer imprisonment 
term, such as twenty years. Lengthier sentences should be a greater 
deterrent against the crime in the first instance and make it less likely 
that an asylum claim would be sustained, especially if the situation in 
Somalia improves over time. Moreover, despite some rumors,141 there is 
no known incident where a Somali pirate has claimed asylum in a 
Western developed country where they are currently being prosecuted. 
Thus, it appears that only high costs and other associated problems in 
bringing accused persons and witnesses to trial in countries that are far 
from Somalia are the only serious practical problems. 
                                                 
37388/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999). The court confirmed this position again in the Medvedyev case. 
Medvedyev and Others v. France, App. 3394/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).  
 
138
  LJN Rotterdam, supra note 82, at 7. 
 
139
  Marie Woolf, Pirates Can Claim UK Asylum , T HE SUNDAY T IMES, 
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/article84478.ece (last visited Jan. 1, 2010). 
On the issue of asylum claims, see generally Yvonne M Dutton, Pirates and Impunity: Is the 
Threat of Asylum Claims a Reason to Allow Pirates to Escape Justice? , 34 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 
236 (2011). 
 
140
  According to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CAT) and the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), state parties are not allowed to expel, return or 
extradite a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would 
be in danger of being subjected to torture. See Amitai Etzioni, Somali Pirates: An Expansive 
Interpretation of Human Rights, 15 T EX. REV. L. & POL. 39, 53–55 (2010). 
 
141
  Kathryn Westcott, Pirates in the Dock, BBC News (May 21, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8059345.stm. 
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Another apparent legal obstacle is whether transferring pirates to 
a third country for prosecution is legal under UNCLOS. Pursuant to 
Article 105, any state can seize a pirate vessel and the courts of the 
capturing country have a right to try pirates.142 According to the ILC: 
This article gives any State the right to seize pirate ships (and 
ships seized by pirates) and to have them adjudicated upon by its courts. 
This right cannot be exercised at a place under the jurisdiction of another 
State.143 
Based on this comment, an author stated that this provision was 
included in UNCLOS to preclude the transfer of suspected pirates to 
third party states.144  However, the ILC Commentary merely indicates 
that a state cannot exercise judicial power in foreign territory.145  Piracy is 
a universal jurisdiction crime under customary international law and, as 
such, the receiving state’s authority to prosecute can be established under 
customary international law.146 
However, whether the pre-UNCLOS customary international law 
of piracy survives after the near-universal acceptance of UNCLOS is a 
contested issue.147 Nevertheless, whether Article 105 authorizes the 
transfer of suspected pirates to a third party may not be a serious 
                                                 
 
142
  UNCLOS, supra note 11, art . 105. 
 
143
  Report of the  International Law Commission to the General Assembly,1956 U.N.Y.B. Int ’l L. 
Comm’n 253, 283. This comment was on the corresponding article of the Draft 1958 High Seas 
Convention. 
 
144
  Eugene Kontorovich, Introductory Note to Exchange of Letters between the European Union 
and the Government of Kenya on the Conditions and Modalities for the Transfer of Persons 
Suspected of Having Committed acts of Piracy, 48 I.L.M. 747, 748 (2009); Eugene Kontorovich, 
International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,  ASIL (Feb. 6, 2009), 
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/13/issue/2/international-legal-responses-piracy-coast-
somalia. 
 
145
  GUILFOYLE, supra note 53, at 1. 
 
146
  GUILFOYLE, supra note 53, at 5; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Belgium), Separate Opinion of President Guillaume, 2002 I.C.J. 3, 37; Arrest Warrant 
of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Joint separate opinion of 
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, 2002 I.C.J. 81; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 229 (7th ed., 2008). As Justice Moore observed in the SS Lotus 
case: “ in the case of . . . piracy by law of nations, there has been conceded a universal 
jurisdiction, under which the person charged with the offence may be tried and punished by any 
nation into whose jurisdiction he may come.” S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 
10 (Sept. 7) (Moore, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 
147
  See generally Kontorovich, supra note 144, at 748. See also Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy 
Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L. J. 183 (2004); 
Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, Piracy, Terrorism and the Insurgent Passenger: A Historical and Legal 
Perspective, in MARITIME TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 60–61 (Natalino Ronzitti ed., 
1990); Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, Foreign Naval Intervention in Cases of Piracy: Problems and 
Strategies, 14 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 353, 361 (1999). 
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problem, as the quoted sentence of the ILC commentary does not refer to 
adjudicative jurisdiction of the prosecuting state. Rather, it is related to 
the enforcement jurisdiction of the seizing state.148 It is clear that the 
quoted sentence in the ILC commentary relates to the seizure of the 
vessel and not the prosecution of pirates.149 It simply indicates that a state 
is not authorized to seize a pirate ship in the territorial, archipelagic, and 
internal waters of another state.150 
The transfer of pirates is undoubtedly permissible under the SUA 
Convention. Indeed, it is not only a legally valid action, but also a duty 
of the capturing country to transfer the suspected pirate to a country that 
is willing to establish jurisdiction under the SUA Convention. However, 
according to the SUA Convention, a state can establish jurisdiction only 
if it has a connection with the incident, ship, victim, or person involved 
in the incident, or if the offence is committed to compel the state to do, 
or abstain from doing, any act.151 Clearly, third party countries may not 
qualify according to these criteria. 
Some authors argued that if any state has a nexus to the incident, 
or if the perpetrator or victim is not interested in prosecuting a pirate, 
prosecution is not possible under this convention.152 However, Article 8 
of the SUA Convention allows the master of a ship of a state party (the 
“flag state”) to deliver a suspected offender to the authorities of any other 
state (the “receiving state”), and the receiving state in turn may request 
the flag state to accept delivery of that person.153 Moreover, the receiving 
state may also notify the states that are willing to establish jurisdiction 
under Article 6(1) to determine if they may accept the person. However, 
if no state is interested in accepting the person, there is no bar in the SUA 
Convention for the receiving state to prosecute the alleged offender. 
Article 10, in fact, imposes an obligation on the state party in the 
territory of which an offender or alleged offender is found to either 
extradite the alleged offender to a country that is willing to establish 
                                                 
 
148
  Roach, supra note 20, at 405; MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER 
OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF T HE SEA 877 (1962). 
 
149
  Roach, supra note 20, at 405. 
 
150
  Id. 
 
151
  SUA Convention 1988, supra note 11, art . 6. 
 152  Dutton, supra note 81, at 209; Gabel, supra note 81, at 1445; Tina Garmon, International Law 
of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of Piracy and Terrorism in the Wake of September 11th, 27 TUL. 
MAR. L .J. 257, 273 (2002). 
 
153
  T reves, supra note 63, at 80–81. 
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jurisdiction under Article 6(1) of the SUA Convention or to prosecute the 
offender in its own court.154 
It is also pertinent to discuss whether there are any legal 
obstacles within the national legal systems of the regional countries for 
prosecuting Somali pirates. This issue can be discussed using Kenya as 
an example. The jurisdiction of the Kenyan Magistrate Courts for the 
prosecution of pirates was initially challenged in the High Court of 
Kenya.155 However, the Kenyan authorities have solved this problem by 
amending relevant law.156 The national legal framework does not appear 
                                                 
 
154
  Guilfoyle, supra note 81, at 149. 
 155  Initially, the Kenyan Authority was prosecuting pirates under sections 69 (1) and (3) of the 
Kenyan Penal Code, which reads as follows: 
69 (1) Any person who, in territorial waters or upon the high seas, commits any act of piracy jure 
gentium  is guilty of the offence of piracy. 
(3) Any person who is guilty of the offence of piracy is liable to imprisonment for life.  
The Penal Code, (2009) Cap. 63 § 69(1), (3) (Kenya). The jurisdiction of the Kenyan  Magistrate 
Courts for the prosecution of pirates under universal jurisdiction was first  challenged in the 
Hassan M Ahmed v. Republic case. Hassan M. Ahmed v. Republic, (2009) K.L.R. (H.C.K.) 
(Kenya), available at http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/55714/. However, the High Court 
of Kenya rejected the challenge, citing that a Kenyan court “was bound to apply international 
norms and instruments since Kenya is a member of the civilized world and is not expected to act 
in contradiction to expectations of member states of the United Nations.” Id. After a brief 
discussion on the principle of universal jurisdiction under international law, the court held that 
the Kenyan Court has the jurisdiction to try Somali pirates under universal jurisdiction. Id. The 
issue arose again in the High Court of Kenya in Re Mohamud Mohamed Dashi & 8 Others. In re 
Mohamud Mohamed Dashi & 8 Others, (2010) K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya). In this case, the 
defense argued the contradiction of Section 69 with Section 5 of the Kenyan Penal Code. Section 
5 reads as follows: “The jurisdiction of the Courts of Kenya for the purpose of this Code extends 
to every place within Kenya, including territorial waters. (emphasis added).” The Penal Code, 
(2009) Cap. 63 § 5 (Kenya). Interestingly, this contradiction was not argued in Hassan M. 
Ahmed v. Republic. Compare Hassan M. Ahmed v. Republic, (2009) K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) 
with In re Mohamud Mohamed Dashi & 8 Others, (2010) K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya). After a very 
comprehensive discussion on the Kenyan Constitutional law, the Penal Code and other relevant 
national laws, the High Court of Kenya held that the Magistrates Court has no jurisdiction to 
prosecute pirates for an incident that occurred on the high seas. In re Mohamud Mohamed Dashi 
& 8 Others, (2010) K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya). 
 
156
  Kenya passed a new law, namely Merchant Shipping Act 2009, which broadens the jurisdiction 
of Kenyan courts. This law not only grants extra-territorial jurisdiction to Kenyan courts, but also 
implements all relevant international legal instruments. Merchant Shipping Act (2012) Cap. 389 
§§ 369(1), 371. However, despite the legislative reform, the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court 
for prosecution was again challenged in Republic v. Abdirarahman Isse Mohmud  & 3 Others, 
where the defense claimed that the Magistrates Court has no jurisdiction under the Merchant 
Shipping Act 2009. However, the Kenyan High Court rejected this view and held that the 
Magistrates Court has jurisdiction under the newly enacted law. Republic v. Abdirahman Isse 
Mohamud & 3 Others, (2012) (Misc Criminal Application, no 72 of 2011). This decision ends 
the longstanding battle over jurisdiction. Paul Musili Wambua, The Jurisdictional Challenges to 
the Prosecution of Piracy Cases in Kenya: Mixed Fortunes for A Perfect Model in the Global 
War Against Piracy, 11 WORLD MAR. U. J. MAR. AFF. 95, 102 (2012). 
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to be a serious problem any longer for the operationalization of national 
courts in regional countries. In addition to Kenya, other regional 
countries, namely Seychelles, Mauritius, and the United Republic of 
Tanzania, have comprehensively reformed their national laws.157 
As these countries prosecute Somali pirates after necessary 
reforms in their domestic legal systems, there is no significant 
jurisdictional issue for the court. For example, the jurisdiction to 
prosecute Somali pirates in the Supreme Court of Seychelles has been 
discussed in Republic v. Mohamed Ahmed Ise & 4 Others.158 The 
Supreme Court of Seychelles, after analyzing the customary international 
law, UNCLOS, and relevant national laws, held that it has the 
jurisdiction to prosecute pirates of foreign nationalities for attacking a 
foreign vessel on the highs seas under universal jurisdiction.159 
Having a suitable national legal framework is not enough for the 
effective prosecution of pirates. Another legal obstacle may be proving 
any case before a national court. While potentially refuted through 
circumstantial evidence, suspected pirates may claim that they are 
innocent fishermen and not pirates. This assertion is the most likely to be 
used because some of the pirates are, in fact, fishermen at the same 
time.160 Bringing the pirates, victims, and witnesses to the capturing 
country from a remote place may be unduly burdensome work. 
According to a report of the UN Secretary-General, the principal reason 
for releasing apprehended Somali pirates is a lack of evidence that is 
sufficient to support prosecution and not a lack of arrangement for 
prosecution.161 However, the establishment of an international court is not 
the answer to this problem, as an international court will face the same 
problem. This is a ground reality of this type of situation and not a 
unique weak point of the national court. 
Finally, another obstacle in the operationalization of national 
courts in regional countries is a lack of funding. For example, Kenya 
submitted a budget of $5.1 million (USD) to the United Nations Office 
                                                 
 157  Secretary General Report 2012, supra note 102, at 14–30. 
 
158
  Republic v. Mohamed Ahmed Ise & Four Others, (2010) Criminal Side no. 76 of 2010 (Sup. Ct. 
of Sey.) 
 
159
  Id. 
 160  Mohamed Abshir Waldo, The Two Piracies In Somalia: Why The World Ignores The Other?, 
WARDHEER NEWS (Jan. 8, 2009), 
http://wardheernews.com/Articles_09/Jan/Waldo/08_The_two_piracies_in_Somalia.html.  
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  Secretary General Report 2010, supra note 10, at 14. 
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on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) for eighteen months.162 However, the 
country received only $2.3 million (USD), leaving a gap of $2.6 million 
(USD).163 According to an expert, considering this lack of funding, “it 
would be very difficult (and politically imprudent too) for Kenya to 
support the prosecutions by its limited resources.”164 Thus, providing the 
necessary funding to regional countries is the most important issue for 
the operationalization of their respective domestic courts. 
C. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL COURTS 
Whatever international institutions are created for the 
prosecution of pirates, national courts will remain the key player. 
Considering the large number of pirates apprehended in different regions 
of the world, one or more international courts might not be able to handle 
the situation. Therefore, strengthening national judicial institutions is 
essential for ensuring the effective prosecution of pirates, which may 
then work as a deterrent to piratical incidents around the world. 
As mentioned above, the Secretary-General identified an option 
to establish a Somali court in a regional state, similar to the Lockerbie 
court.165 The report proposed the establishment of a Somali court in a 
regional state with or without the participation of the UN.166 The 
participation of the UN would mean the appointment of UN-selected 
judges and prosecutors.167 However, there was no participation of the UN 
or regional organizations in the Lockerbie court.168 Although such a court 
would be established mainly under the national law of Somalia,169 if there 
is participation of the UN, this court cannot be treated as purely a 
national court, and it will not be an international court either. In that case, 
it will be an internationalized national court. 
                                                 
 
162
  Wambua, supra note 156, at 111. 
 
163
  Id. 
 164  Id. 
 
165
  Secretary General Report 2010, supra note 10, at 27–29. Lockerbie Court was a Scottish court 
sitt ing in the Netherlands to prosecute two Libyan officials accused of the Pan Am Flight 103 
bombing, which killed 259 passengers and crew as well as 11 residents of the Scottish town of 
Lockerbie. See Michael P. Scharf, Terrorism on Trial: The Lockerbie Criminal Proceedings, 6 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP . L. 355 (2000). 
 
166
  Secretary General Report 2010, supra note 10, at 27. 
 167  Id. 
 
168
  Id. at 27 n.41. 
 
169
  Id. at  27. 
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The establishment of this court requires a special agreement 
between Somalia, the host state, and the UN. This option has some 
practical and jurisdictional limitations. First, due to concerns about the 
Somali legal system, it will be difficult for some Western countries to 
transfer pirates to Somalia. Moreover, the present government in Somalia 
is not recognized by all of the states of the world, which may create some 
practical problems.170 However, if the UN supervises the court, these 
concerns may not be a serious problem. There may be some complexity 
regarding the legal status of the proposed court under the Somali legal 
system in relation to appeals. Moreover, this court would apparently 
create a double standard, or two types of justice, within the Somali legal 
system if deviation from Somali law is allowed for piracy prosecution. 
Despite these minor problems, it appears to be a workable solution. 
Similar to this court, another form of internationalized national 
court proposed by the Secretary-General’s report is a special chamber 
within the national jurisdiction of a state or states in the region, with the 
participation of the UN.171 This court would primarily be a national court, 
but there would be some UN-nominated judges.172 Its jurisdiction would 
be based on the national law of the host state in accordance with the 
universal jurisdiction provided by international law. There is no 
significant jurisdictional problem in this type of solution. The 
establishment of this type of court requires a significant commitment 
from a regional state. Moreover, it may require major changes in the 
domestic legal and institutional frameworks of the host country to 
conform to the international standard. The relationship of this court with 
the superior court of the host state is an issue to be determined. 
The need to operationalize national courts can be explained by 
using Somali piracy as an example. To achieve the goal of the effective 
prosecution of Somali pirates, building judicial capacity and prison 
facilities within Somalia and other regional states may be the most viable 
option. This must be supplemented by the willingness for the prosecution 
of pirates by extra-regional states in some circumstances. At present, at 
least twenty countries, including regional and extra-regional countries, 
are engaged in the prosecution of Somali pirates.173 However, the number 
of prosecutions in countries outside the African region is very low and 
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 171  Secretary General Report 2010, supra note 10, at 30. 
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  Secretary General Report 2012, supra note 106, at 4–5. 
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countries outside the region are only prosecuting pirates if the incident 
involves a direct attack on their ships.174 Over the past five years, 1,063 
Somali pirates have been prosecuted or are in the process of being 
prosecuted in twenty countries, as shown in Table 1.175 
 
Table 1: Prosecution of Somali Pirates by National Courts 
(2006–January 2012)176 
 
Country Number held Notes 
Belgium 11 Convicted 
Comoros 6  
France 15 5 convicted 
Germany 10  
India 119  
Japan 4  
Kenya 143 50 convicted 
Madagascar 12  
Malaysia 7  
Maldives 37 Awaiting deportation in 
absence of a law under 
which to prosecute 
Netherlands 29 10 convicted 
Oman 22 All convicted 
Seychelles 70 63 convicted 
   
Somalia–Puntland 290 Approximately 240 
convicted 
Somalia–Somaliland 94 68 convicted 
(approximately 60 
subsequently released) 
Somalia–South 
Central 
18 Status of trial unclear 
Republic of Korea 5 5 convicted, appeal 
pending before the 
Supreme Court 
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  Id. 
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Spain 2 Both convicted 
United Arab Emirates 10  
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
12 6 convicted 
US 28 17 convicted 
Yemen 129 123 convicted and 6 
acquitted 
Total 1,063  
 
Somalia is the greatest prosecutor of its pirates. Strengthening 
legal and institutional frameworks within Somalia may further increase 
the number of prosecutions. However, considering the present volatile 
situation and the concern over human rights violations, the global 
community will primarily have to rely on the prosecution of Somali 
pirates in other states in the region. 
In his report, the Secretary-General identified the establishment 
of a special chamber within the national jurisdiction of a state or states as 
an option in the region.177 For the speedy and effective prosecution of 
pirates, it may be a viable option. The UN can extend financial help to 
regional states for establishing such special tribunals. Moreover, it can 
observe these tribunals to ensure that the due process and human rights 
standards are maintained. Finally, the Security Council, through 
Resolution 2015 of October 24, 2011, decided to consider the 
establishment of specialized “anti-piracy courts in Somalia and other 
States in the region with substantial international participation and/or 
support.”178 Subsequently, the Secretary-General has submitted a report 
to the Security Council on the establishment of specialized anti-piracy 
courts in Somalia and other states in the region.179 The Secretary-General 
has identified a detailed framework for international assistance for 
enhancing the capacity of national courts in five regional states that are 
willing to prosecute Somali pirates.180 He identified specific measures to 
be taken for capacity building in relation to the “main components of the 
criminal process—investigations, prosecution, the courts, legal aid and 
defense representation and prisons.”181 As observed in this article, 
                                                 
 
177
  Secretary General Report 2010, supra note 10, at 3-4. 
 
178
  S.C. Res. 2015, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2015 (Oct. 24, 2011).  
 179  See generally Secretary General Report 2012, supra note 103. 
 
180
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181
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capacity building is critical for the operationalization of both legal and 
institutional national courts. 
The global community needs to provide necessary funding to the 
regional countries, particularly Somalia, for the capacity building of its 
courts and prison facilities. Significant funding is reasonable given that 
the maritime piracy cost the global economy between $5.7 and $6.1 
billion in 2012, and given the incalculable human cost involving killings 
and widespread hostage-taking182 as well as the serious negative effects 
imposed by Somali piracy on global trade and commerce. 
III.Prosecution of Pirates: Operationalizing Judicial Institutions 
For ensuring the prosecution of pirates, the worldwide 
operationalization of the role of judicial institutions is essential. The 
pertinent question is, though, can an existing court or tribunal could be 
used for the prosecution of pirates? Two international judicial 
institutions—the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 
and the International Chamber Of Commerce (ICC)—are the most 
relevant in this regard, considering their existing jurisdictional 
framework. 
A. TOWARDS A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTION 
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PIRATES? 
i. ITLOS 
ITLOS was established under UNCLOS as a judicial institution 
for the settlement of disputes concerning the implementation and 
interpretation of the convention.183 However, the drafting history of 
UNCLOS does not provide any indication that the tribunal may act as a 
criminal court or that there was any intention of the drafter (even at the 
early stage of negotiation) that ITLOS may work as a criminal court.184 
                                                 
 
182
  Jonathan Bellish, The Economic Cost Of Somali Piracy, 2012, at  1 (Oceans Beyond Piracy 
Working Paper, 2013), available at 
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/ecop2012final_2.pdf; Press Release, Security 
Council, Human Cost of Piracy Off Somalia Coast “ Incalculable”, Full Range of Legal, 
Preventative Measures Needed to Thwart Attacks, Security Council Told; U.N. Press Release 
SC/10551 (Feb. 22, 2012). 
 183  UNCLOS, supra note 11, Annex. VI, art . 21. 
 
184
  See generally CTR. FOR OCEANS LAW & POLICY, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW, UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 331–420 (Myron H. Nordquist et 
al. eds., 1989). 
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Nevertheless, some commentators have suggested that pirates 
should be put under the jurisdiction of ITLOS.185 However, it is not 
possible to include the prosecution of pirates under the jurisdiction of 
ITLOS without amending UNCLOS or adopting a new treaty. 
Undoubtedly, the existing judges of ITLOS are competent in the law of 
the sea. However, they may not all be competent or willing to adjudicate 
criminal proceedings. This problem may be solved by creating a special 
chamber for piracy prosecution. The existing location of the tribunal, 
Hamburg, is also not suitable for piracy prosecution, as most of the 
incidents are occurring in the African and Asian regions. However, 
arrangements could be made to situate a special chamber on piracy in a 
piracy-prone region. 
One commentator suggested that ITLOS has the jurisdiction 
ratione materiae, and it is possible to create the jurisdiction ratione 
personae over Somali pirates through a Security Council resolution.186 
This proposition has two aspects: whether ITLOS has the jurisdiction 
ratione materiae and whether it is possible to create ITLOS’ jurisdiction 
ratione personae over pirates through a UN Security Council resolution. 
As noted earlier, piracy has not been identified as a breach or threat to 
international security under the UN Charter. Such a resolution may be 
suitable for creating jurisdiction over Somali pirates, but not over piracy 
generally. Moreover, whether the tribunal has jurisdiction ratione 
materiae is not fully clear. However, jurisdiction can be created through 
an amendment to UNCLOS or the adoption of a new agreement. All of 
the above problems can be solved through the adoption of a new 
international treaty or an amendment to UNCLOS. Even if this step is 
feasible, ITLOS should not be considered the most suitable forum for the 
prosecution of pirates. It can be submitted that piracy as a crime of 
international significance should not be isolated from other international 
or transnational crimes such as terrorism, drug trafficking, human 
trafficking and migrant smuggling, money laundering, organized crime, 
and transnational wildlife and forest crime. However, that does not 
necessarily mean that it is not legally possible to establish a separate 
                                                 
 
185
  See generally Craig Thedwall, Choosing the Right Yardarm: Establishing an International 
Court for Piracy, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 501 (2010); Beck Pemberton, The International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea as a High Court of Piracy (One Earth Future Foundation Working Paper, 
2010), available at 
http://oneearthfuture.org/sites/oneearthfuture.org/files/documents/publications/ITLOS-Beck-
Pemberton.pdf. 
 
186
  Thedwall, supra note 185, at 518. 
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court for piracy. However, if a separate court for piracy is established 
now, in the future we may have to establish many specialized courts for 
other maritime crimes if they become an endemic threat like piracy. 
ii. ICC 
Some commentators have suggested that pirates should be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC through the negotiation of a new 
agreement.187 It was even suggested that some piratical acts, including 
extensive and unjustified appropriation of property, unlawful 
confinement, the taking of hostages, and willful killing may even be 
qualified as war crimes.188 However, “pirate attacks may be more akin to 
intermittent internal disturbances, such as sporadic acts of violence, not 
falling within the statutory definition of armed conflict.”189 Thus, these 
activities cannot be treated as war crimes. Rather, we should examine 
how piracy can be included within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
It must further be considered whether it would be suitable to 
include piracy within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The present structure of 
the court makes it unlikely. First, assembling a large number of 
suspected pirates and witnesses in the Netherlands from around the world 
may be difficult. Further, the prosecution of piracy in the ICC may be 
costly. However, these problems can be solved by establishing one or 
more special benches of the ICC, which could then sit in the piracy-
prone regions. If the proposed piracy benches of the ICC sit regionally, it 
will largely solve the question of proximity of offence and offender. To 
make this arrangement more effective, the global community may also 
need to “create a comprehensive provision that defines piracy and 
recognizes the numerous crimes—such as hostage-taking or money 
laundering or organized crime—it can encompass.”190 It has been 
suggested that there is a need to “look beyond existing treaties and 
towards domestic laws in crafting an international definition of piracy 
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and related offenses.”191 Whether states will agree to broaden the 
definition of piracy is uncertain. Moreover, the establishment of such a 
court is a technically difficult issue. 
The prosecution of pirates in the ICC is not presently possible 
without amending the ICC statute. Amendment of the Rome Statute 
would be a lengthy process and any change would only come into effect 
after one year of the adoption and ratification of the amendment.192 The 
ICC will not be able to take cognizance of offences committed before the 
entry into force of the proposed amendment. According to Article 24 of 
the Rome Statute, “no person shall be criminally responsible under this 
Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute.” Moreover, 
“in the event of a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a 
final judgment, the law more favorable to the person being investigated, 
prosecuted or convicted shall apply.”193 
However, it may be argued that, albeit weakly, this provision is 
only applicable in the case of entry into force of the Rome Statute. If a 
new crime is added to the statute, the court can take cognizance of an 
incident relating to such a crime if the incident occurred after the entry 
into force of the Rome Statute, but before the entry into force of the 
proposed amendment. However, it can only be done after entry into force 
of the amending legal instrument. This interpretation can be challenged 
using another article of the statute. According to Article 22 of the Rome 
Statute, “A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute 
unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the court.”194 
Although piracy is a well-recognized crime under international 
law, it is clearly not a crime under the jurisdiction of the court before the 
entry into force of the proposed amendment. Moreover, if the Rome 
Statute is amended, dissenting state parties will have a right to withdraw 
from the statute.195 However, this problem may be solved by adopting an 
optional protocol that would only be applicable to states that will ratify 
the protocol. However, if the adoption of a new protocol modifies the 
provisions of the Rome Statute, particularly the provision regarding 
retrospective effects, parties may arguably have the right to withdraw 
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from the ICC. Thus, the establishment of one or more benches for the 
prosecution of pirates through an optional protocol may be problematic. 
The extent to which this proposed international judicial 
institution would be successful is difficult to predict at present. Any 
proposed court would have several limitations. First, there is no 
international maritime police force; thus, the political will of states still 
remains the key factor. Second, creating an international judicial 
institution will not necessarily create an enforcement jurisdiction for 
foreign states within the territorial sea and archipelagic and internal 
waters of the coastal states. As discussed earlier, a large amount of 
maritime violence occurs within these waters. Finally, considering the 
number and frequency of piracy and armed robbery incidents, one or two 
international courts will not be enough for the prosecution of pirates 
from around the world. Even, after the establishment of an international 
judicial avenue, the operationalization of national judicial institutions 
will remain a critical issue.196 
The present experience of the ICC also proves that international 
courts are not a very suitable institution for the prosecution of pirates. 
With its annual budget of nearly $140 million (USD) and $900 million 
(USD) spending in the first ten years,197 the ICC has dealt with only 
twenty-one cases since its establishment in 2002.198 As noted above, 
1,063 Somali pirates have been prosecuted in the national courts of 
twenty states since 2006.199 This number clearly shows that global piracy 
is not a suitable area for transferring jurisdiction from national courts to 
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international courts considering the practical reality. For a sustainable 
solution to the problem, the role of national courts must be 
operationalized. 
B. OPERATIONALIZING THE ROLE OF NATIONAL COURTS: MILES TO GO 
BEFORE WE SLEEP 
The prosecution of piracy has long relied on the concept of 
universal jurisdiction over piracy, which is mainly based on a system of 
judicial altruism.200 In practice, there are few incidents where a state has 
shown interest in prosecuting pirates by exercising universal 
jurisdiction.201 With the exception of the prosecution of Somali pirates by 
some regional states, most of the pirates prosecuted recently have not 
reflected the exercise of universal jurisdiction.202 In many of the cases, 
the incidents involved attacks on a vessel of the prosecuting state.203 The 
recent “catch and release” phenomenon in the Gulf of Aden is not an 
exception to the overall attitude of the states. An empirical study of 754 
piratical incidents eligible for universal jurisdiction in the period from 
1998 to 2007 showed that there was reliance on universal jurisdiction in 
only four cases.204 That is, there was a prosecution based on universal 
jurisdiction in only 0.53 percent of the incidents.205 
As observed by the Head of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in 
Hamburg, Germany: 
What is totally clear, however, is that the German judicial system 
cannot and should not, act as World Police. Active prosecution 
measures will only be initiated if the German State has a particular, 
well-defined interest in prosecution—this, I think, is in accordance 
with the stance taken by all German ministries and authorities.206 
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Spanish prosecutors also took a similar approach.207 However, Spain later 
amended domestic legislation. The recent prosecution of pirates in the 
US also shows a similar approach.208 The US authorities are only 
interested in prosecuting pirates if the victim’s vessel flies the US flag.209 
As observed by Eugene Kontorovich, “The U.S. has a policy of only 
prosecuting when the attack directly affects the U.S.”210 
Moreover, most of the maritime violence occurs within the 
domestic jurisdiction of coastal states. This makes the role of national 
courts prominent. As observed by Dubner: 
most of the human rights violations and losses to commercial 
shipping occur either in territorial waters, internal waters, or 
international straits . . . The result is that unless the coastal or 
archipelagic state is desirous and capable of stopping these acts of 
maritime violence, the piracy will not be stopped. Why? Because 
even if the coastal state has municipal legislation dealing with piracy, 
it may be unable or unwilling to enforce it.211 
Dubner was writing in 1997, but the situation has remained 
unchanged. Even if international law is fully implemented within the 
national legal framework, the problem will not be solved if states 
continue to show reluctance to apprehend pirates and submit them to 
their respective national courts. Thus, the issue of operationalization is 
critical. 
An increasing awareness among states to operationalize the role 
of national courts is the most viable solution to the problem. The global 
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community should come forward to prosecute piracy on the high seas 
and to take appropriate steps to ensure the prosecution of armed robbers 
who are engaged in maritime violence within the jurisdiction of the 
coastal state. The SUA Convention deals with the issue of prosecution 
more comprehensively than UNCLOS. The role that international law 
expects from national courts may be achieved by applying both 
conventions concurrently. UNCLOS may be suitable for apprehending 
pirates in the high seas, but the application of the SUA Convention is 
needed to ensure the prosecution of the captured pirates, as well as the 
prosecution of armed robbers who have engaged in violence within the 
jurisdiction of coastal states. 
Recent UN Security Council resolutions provided an indication 
of the increasing realization of this proposition. Resolution 1816, which 
was the first resolution to address Somali piracy, primarily discusses 
states’ obligations under UNCLOS. In a subsequent resolution, the 
Security Council noted that the SUA Convention provides for parties’ 
jurisdiction to prosecute or transfer a suspected person to another state 
party for prosecution in cases of seizure or unauthorized control over a 
vessel.212 The Security Council also urged the state parties to the SUA 
Convention to build judicial capacity for the prosecution of Somali 
pirates.213 Although this resolution was only concerned with Somali 
pirates, this is a clear affirmation of state parties’ obligations for 
establishing judicial capacity for the prosecution of persons engaged in 
unlawful acts under the SUA Convention. 
An encouraging aspect of the SUA Convention is that it has no 
geographical limitations and it imposes a clear obligation to prosecute or 
extradite. If all relevant countries are party to this convention, the victim 
state may request the coastal state to hand over the suspected offenders. 
Moreover, the SUA Convention imposes a clear obligation on the state 
parties to criminalize offences listed in this convention under domestic 
law. This is a very important issue in relation to the exercise of 
jurisdiction by national courts. 
International law is not the main obstacle in combating piracy. In 
general, international law provides a workable legal framework. Many of 
the UNCLOS legal loopholes have been arguably solved by the SUA 
Convention.214 An increased political will to implement the relevant 
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provisions of UNCLOS and the SUA Convention can ensure the 
operationalization of the role of national courts in combating piracy and 
maritime armed robbery as envisioned by these conventions. 
The main obstacle in operationalizing national courts is the non-
implementation of the international law of piracy in the domestic legal 
system.215 There are four main issues regarding the operationalization of 
national courts for the prosecution of pirates: criminalization of the act of 
piracy (including participation, facilitation, conspiracy, and attempts) 
under a domestic law endorsement of a universal jurisdiction; legal and 
operational arrangements for enforcement (through detention and arrest 
at sea); trial of apprehended pirates; and international cooperation for the 
apprehension and prosecution of pirates.216 
In practice, the state of implementation of international law in 
domestic legal systems is poor. Most countries are yet to implement 
UNCLOS and the SUA Convention in their domestic legal framework.217 
The IMO conducted a review of national legislation on piracy in 2010. 
As shown in the Table 2, among the forty countries that submitted 
samples of their legislation, only six countries implemented the 
definition of piracy from Article 101 of UNCLOS within their national 
legalization, and only eight countries wholly or partially implemented 
universal jurisdiction under Article 105 of UNCLOS.218 
 
Table 2: Implementation of International Law in National 
Legislation (40 Countries)219 
 
Category 
Number of 
Responses 
Party to UNCLOS 31 
Piracy defined as in UNCLOS 101 10 
UNCLOS definition otherwise incorporated 6 
Universal jurisdiction of UNCLOS 105 wholly or 
partially implemented 
8 
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Piracy addressed by reference to the Law of Nations 
(jure gentium) 
5 
Piracy addressed by reference to other laws on crimes of 
violence 
27 
Party to SUA 1988 37 
SUA in full force 7 
SUA offences (articles 3.1(a) and (b)) effectively 
applicable to piracy 
10 
SUA mandatory jurisdiction conditions (Article 6.1) 
effectively implemented 
4 
SUA discretionary jurisdiction conditions (Article 6.2) 
implemented 
0 
SUA jurisdiction condition (Article 6.4) implemented 0 
 
The implementation record of the SUA Convention is more 
discouraging among the states that responded to the IMO survey. Only 
four countries had implemented the mandatory jurisdiction conditions 
under Article 6.1.220 No countries had effectively implemented the 
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 6.2 or jurisdiction under Article 
6.4.221 
Against this backdrop, the UN Security Council urged member 
states to criminalize piracy within domestic law.222 Due to the increasing 
efforts of the UN Security Council and different specialized agencies of 
the United Nations, states are showing their willingness to update their 
respective national laws to implement relevant international legal 
instruments.223 A number of countries of the African region, including 
Kenya, the Seychelles, Mauritius, and the United Republic of Tanzania, 
have amended their national laws.224 Countries outside the African region 
have also shown some interest in amending their domestic legislation.225 
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The Czech Republic, France, Italy, Malta, Panama, and Spain, for 
example, recently amended their relevant legislation.226 
A liberal approach from judges in interpreting national law is 
also needed for operationalization of national courts. In many countries, 
piracy laws are very old. For example, the US piracy law was enacted in 
1819227 and did not define the crime of “piracy.” It simply states that 
“[w]hoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by 
the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United 
States, shall be imprisoned for life.”228 In a recent case, United States v. 
Said, a US district court decided that as this law was enacted in 1819 so 
“law of nations” means international law in 1819, and thus they 
considered the definition of piracy under customary international law as 
not well settled.229 The court was reluctant to consider the definition of 
piracy provided by the 1958 High Seas Convention and UNCLOS.230 
Instead they decided that the 1820 decision of the US Supreme Court in 
United States v. Smith, which defines piracy as robbery at sea,231 was still 
the authority in the US; thus, unless a pirate succeeds in stealing 
something, a piracy charge cannot be sustained.232 
However, the legal reasoning behind this decision has been 
doubted by some US experts.233 On the heels of United States v. Said, 
another US district court has taken a totally opposite view in United 
States v. Hasan.234 In this case, the court denied the defendant’s argument 
that there is no consensus definition of piracy under modern international 
law.235 After a very extensive discussion on US and foreign cases,236 and 
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relevant national and international legal instruments, the court concluded 
that “the definition of piracy in UNCLOS reflects the current state of 
customary international law for purposes of interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 
1651.”237 Agreeing with the district court decision in United States v. 
Hasan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit finally 
overturned the decision of United States v. Said in its decision in United 
States v. Dire.238 
The experience in the United States shows the importance of the 
approach of the judiciary in the operationalization of national courts. A 
court may take a rigid position, despite inclusion of universal jurisdiction 
in the national legal framework. For example, Article 381 of the 
Criminal Code of the Netherlands has vested universal jurisdiction for 
criminal proceedings in cases of piracy.239 However, the Netherlands 
court made the universal jurisdiction subject to the “reasonable interest” 
test.240 Thus, the Netherlands courts will only prosecute if the 
Netherlands has a reasonable interest. 
This attitude supports the main argument of this article that the 
altruistic model is not working. Neither the executive department of the 
government nor the courts are supportive of the idea that a state will 
prosecute a pirate when that country has no involvement with the 
incident or with the persons involved with the incident. Moreover, 
despite a clear jurisprudence establishing universal jurisdiction, there is 
no recent record of piracy prosecution based only on universal 
jurisdiction, with the exception of the prosecution of Somali pirates in 
regional countries. 
It is clear that there is a need for legal reform in many 
countries.241 It remains a significant challenge that states are not prompt 
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in enacting necessary domestic legislation after ratifying an international 
treaty.  Although international law imposes a general obligation to 
cooperate, it does not impose a positive obligation on states to take 
practical action for enforcing the law of piracy on the high seas. 
However, without a proactive role of states vis-à-vis enforcement, the 
operationalization of national courts for the prosecution of pirates cannot 
be ensured. 
In the absence of a global police force, international law is 
wholly dependent on states for enforcement. Recent joint action by 
different states off the coast of Somalia can be treated as an encouraging 
example in respect to enforcement, although the failure of the 
prosecution of apprehended pirates has largely overshadowed the 
positive effect of this enforcement action. Nevertheless, the global 
community needs to consider the issue of enforcement seriously and 
systematically. 
Building necessary facilitates for prosecution and imprisonment 
is a critical issue in developing/least developed countries. Many 
developing/least developed countries may lack adequate court and prison 
facilities and suffer from shortage of trained human resources. A global 
initiative for capacity building is needed. The Secretary-General, in his 
report submitted in 2012, identified specific measures for assistance for 
specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia, the Seychelles, Kenya, 
Mauritius, and the United Republic of Tanzania.242 He also identified 
specific measures to be taken by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and UNDOC in relation to each of these 
countries.243 In his report, the Secretary-General stated the following: 
If further international assistance were provided and the other matters 
set out in the present report are implemented, the projection is that in 
two years, Somalia, Kenya, Seychelles, Mauritius and the United 
Republic of Tanzania collectively could conduct a maximum of 125 
piracy prosecutions per year in accordance with international 
standards, involving up to 1,250 suspects. This would be a very 
significant contribution to combating piracy off the coast of Somalia, 
and would be greater than the total number of suspects prosecuted 
globally to date.244 
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This projection of the Secretary-General strongly supports the 
need for global assistance for operationalizing national courts. Mere legal 
implementation of international law within domestic legal systems will 
not be enough. There must be concerted efforts ensuring institutional 
support. 
However, there is no well-funded project for institutional 
development and equipping developing countries’ coast guard forces for 
combating piracy all over the world. At present, the United Nations 
(including UNDP and UNDOC) is mainly concerned with providing 
financial assistance for the prosecution of Somali piracy.245 While the 
IMO has a long-term project for combating piracy, which began in 
1998,246 this project is for organizing regional seminars and workshops in 
the piracy-infested areas of the world and for evaluation and assessment, 
mainly to develop regional agreements on the implementation of counter 
piracy measures.247  Although national courts should be the main actors 
for the prosecution of pirates, the system should not be operated based on 
the altruistic model. The failure of the altruistic model of the universal 
jurisdiction-based system can be explained by simple example. If a 
military vessel of the United Kingdom apprehends a pirates’ vessel and 
arrests some pirates on the high sea while the pirates are attacking a 
vessel flying the flag of Liberia, who should take responsibility for 
prosecuting the pirates—the United Kingdom or Liberia? Common sense 
leads us to think that it should be Liberia. The United Kingdom has 
already given a free service to Liberia by saving its vessel, so why would 
it take further responsibility for the prosecution of the pirates? 
Unfortunately, under UNCLOS, Liberia has no obligation to prosecute 
these pirates. 
Although UNCLOS does not impose a responsibility for 
prosecution on the flag state of an attacked vessel,248 Article 6 of the 
SUA Convention imposes an obligation on each state party to take such 
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the SUA 
Convention offences when the offence is committed against or on board 
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  Piracy and armed robbery against ships, INT’L MAR. ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/ourwork/security/piracyarmedrobbery/pages/default.aspx (last visited July 
25, 2012). 
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248
  But see UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 94 (imposing a duty to the flag state for effective exercise 
of jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over sh ips flying its 
flag). An obligation for prosecution of pirates for the flag state can arguably be extrapolated from 
this article. 
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a ship flying the flag of the state at the time the offence is committed. 
However, there is a serious practical difficulty in implementing this SUA 
Convention obligation. Under international law, owners have full liberty 
to choose the flag for their ship, provided they satisfy the registration 
requirements of the flag state. Consequently, every state has the right to 
set its own regulations and standards for the registration of ships. The 
nationality of a ship is determined by the flag it flies. UNCLOS imposed 
a condition of a “genuine link” between the ship and the flag state, 
without precisely defining the term.249 This seems to be an incomplete 
provision and has created more problems than it has solved. A mere 
administrative act such as registration is insufficient to fulfill the 
condition of “genuine link.”250 
These legal loopholes have created profitable business for flags 
of convenience. A huge number of ships, about 69.7 percent of the total 
merchant fleet, operate with flags of convenience.251 The leading flags of 
convenience country, Panama, alone represents 22.5 percent of the world 
tonnage, followed by Liberia at 12.1 percent, and Marshall Islands at 7.1 
percent.252 Despite their position as leading shipping nations (in respect 
of registered tonnage), none of these countries is currently participating 
in the anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia.253  The most 
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  ALAN KHEE-JIN T AN, VESSEL-SOURCE MARINE POLLUTION: T HE LAW AND POLITICS OF 
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http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_2/merits/Judgment.01.07.99.E.pdf
; Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization, Advisory Opinion, 1960 I.C.J. 150 (June 8), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/43/2419.pdf. However, the original meaning of the term 
“genuine link’ was different, as stated by the ICJ in the Nottebohm case: “nationality is a legal 
bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests 
and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It  may be said to 
constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either 
directly by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected 
with the population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State. 
Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection vis-à-vis another State, if it  
constitutes a translation into juridical terms of the individual’s connection with the State which 
has made him its national.” Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Second Phase, 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 
(Apr. 6), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/18/2674.pdf. 
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  Inst. of Shipping Econ. & Logistics, ISL Comment, SHIPPING STAT. & MARKET REV., July 2011, 
at 5. 
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  About CMF, COMBINED MAR. FORCES, http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/about/ (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2014); Mission, EU NAVFOR, http://eunavfor.eu/mission/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
According to an official of the United States Department of State, “one of the primary challenges 
we face is that many states, to varying degrees, have not demonstrated sustained political will to 
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problematic aspect of this culture of flags of convenience is that the 
vessels have little connection with the flag state.254 The practice of flags 
of convenience has created anarchy in the international maritime sector. 
The effect of this fundamental flaw in the international system has not 
been highlighted in the existing literature on piracy. 
Accordingly altruistic model will not be very successful. The 
flag state of the attacked vessel should take the main responsibility for 
the prosecution of pirates. If there is an assurance from the flag state that 
they will accept apprehended pirates for prosecution, more states could 
well be encouraged to instruct their naval vessels to help foreign vessels 
in piratical incidents, as their efforts will have greater consequence.255 As 
observed by a senior official of the US Government 
flag states should consider their counter-piracy responsibilities – 
including by prosecuting the pirates that attack their ships. The 
economic stakes for flag states are significant. Ship registrations earn 
millions of dollars a year for flags states, tens of millions of dollars in 
some cases. Those financial rewards come with responsibilities, 
including the defense of their ships through prosecution of suspected 
pirates.256 
Moreover, some flag states that are operating open registry may 
be ideal place for the prosecution of pirates because prosecution in these 
countries may be less expensive than in developed countries currently 
participating in the anti-piracy naval operation. 
                                                 
criminalize piracy and to prosecute suspects who attack their interests. The world’s largest 
registry states (so-called ‘flags of convenience’) have generally proven either incapable or 
unwilling to prosecute suspected pirates who attack their ships.” Jennifer Landsidle, 
Transnational Piracy: To Pay or to Prosecute?: Remarks, 105 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 549, 
550 (2011). 
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  Thomas Kelly, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Remarks 
at Combating Piracy Week (Oct. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/199929.htm. 
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The UN Security Council also emphasized the issue of the 
prosecution of pirates by a country that has some link with the incident. 
The UN Security Council, through its Resolution 2020: 
Calls upon all States, and in particular flag, port, and coastal States, 
States of the nationality of victims, and perpetrators of piracy and 
armed robbery, and other States with relevant jurisdiction under 
international law and national legislation, to cooperate in determining 
jurisdiction, and in the investigation and prosecution of all persons 
responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of 
Somalia.257 
However, this resolution targeted all countries with a possible 
jurisdiction. This resolution does not indicate which country should take 
the main responsibility. Obviously, from a practical perspective, the flag 
state of the attacked vessel and the state of the nationality of the 
perpetrators of piracy should take the main responsibility. Other states 
may not have a significant interest in the matter. In the case of maritime 
armed robbery, however, the coastal state should take a proactive role for 
prosecution, as it has an international responsibility for safeguarding 
foreign nationals within its sovereign jurisdiction. This is not just an 
issue of jurisdiction. The main issue is who should take on the burden of 
prosecution. 
The global community should follow a policy that is pragmatic 
and implementable, not just based on altruism. Accordingly, a number of 
initiatives must be taken for the operationalization of national courts for 
the prosecution of pirates. First, the global community should take the 
necessary steps to ensure proper implementation of international law on 
maritime piracy in the national legal systems of all countries. Second, 
there should be an increasing effort at the global level to ensure the 
availability of the necessary funding for the establishment of institutional 
facilities in the developing countries, particularly in the piracy-prone 
regions. Finally, it is time to examine how to ensure the implementation 
of the responsibilities of the flag states of attacked vessels. 
However, as explained above, ensuring the implementation of 
the responsibilities of flag states is not an easy task because of the 
widespread use of flags of convenience. Nevertheless, it does not 
diminish in any way the legal obligation of the flag state, whether it is a 
flag of convenience country or not. Proper implementation of the flag 
state responsibilities may encourage ship-owners to flag their vessels in 
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countries that are capable of fulfilling their international responsibility. A 
counter-argument may be made that a country of beneficial ownership of 
vessel should take the responsibility. However, this relationship is 
neither an international law recognized relationship nor is it easy to 
determine. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Maritime piracy and armed robbery is an area in which the 
international legal system is dependent on the role of national courts. 
However, previous experience has shown that, due to a lack of political 
will from states, this anticipated role of national courts does not match 
the reality. This does not necessarily mean that transferring the role of 
national courts to international courts will change the present 
unsatisfactory scenario. The global community may even consider 
establishing a permanent court for piracy. However, for the practical 
reasons outlined here, one or more international courts will not be able to 
solve the problem completely. The most viable solution will be to 
operationalize the anticipated role of national courts. 
This situation raises the issue of the need to re-examine the 
limitations of national judicial institutions as an international law actor in 
this world of sovereign states. While this is not to suggest that the 
international court itself is a successful actor in the international legal 
system, it is argued that a more coherent international legal system, 
clearly identifying the roles of international and national courts and 
backed by a proactive global political will, may pave the way to 
overcoming the present unsatisfactory situation. 
Although there may arguably be a scope for creating new 
international courts, national courts are and should be the primary actors 
in this regard. However, despite legal commitments from state parties, 
the role of national courts has not been operationalized properly. States 
have shown widespread reluctance in realizing the full potential of 
national courts. Somali piracy has clearly revealed this longstanding 
reluctance of states. 
This article proposed a number of suggestions for the 
operationalization of judicial institutions. First, states must ensure the 
proper implementation of the international law of piracy in their 
respective domestic legal systems. This legal implementation must be 
supplemented by institutional arrangements for the enforcement of the 
relevant legislation. The global community should immediately take 
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concerted action in building the capacity of developing/least developed 
countries. Finally, the system cannot be successful if it is based on a fully 
altruistic model of universal jurisdiction. There should be an increasing 
dialogue among states for proper implementation of the flag state’s 
obligations. 
 
 
